Alayna J. Culbertson, J. Blaine Johnson, Eva C. Johnson, and Diane Pearl Meibos v. The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Commissioner Randy Horiuchi and Commissioner Brent Overson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Alayna J. Culbertson, J. Blaine Johnson, Eva C.
Johnson, and Diane Pearl Meibos v. The Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
Commissioner Randy Horiuchi and
Commissioner Brent Overson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas R. Short; Salt Lake County Attorney; Patrick F. Holden; Deputy County Attorney; Jay D.
Gurmankin;Chris R Hogle; Bermn, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage; Attorney for Commissioners
Overson and Horiuchi.
Diane Peral Meibos; Pro Se; Walter F. Bugden; Bugden, Collins and Morton.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, No. 960212 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/149
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
60 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. *3 to 02-12-r/y 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE 
JOHNSON, EVA C. JOHNSON, and DIANE 
PEARL MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORJUCHI and COMMISSIONER 
BRENT OVERSON, individually, 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 960212CA 
Priority No. 14 
Defendants/Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court 
Entered April 14, 1995 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Presiding 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS 
Appellant - Attorney pro se 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092-4212 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Bugden, Collins & Morton 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorney for Appellants Johnsons 
and Culbertson 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
PATRICK F.HOLDEN 
2001 South State Street, S-3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Attorneys for the Board of County Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County 
JAYGURMANKIN 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
NICKJ.COLESSIDES 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3303 
Attorneys for Horiuchi and Overson 
1 ^ '->J3W» t t m wmrw 
1 6 1996-
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE 
JOHNSON, EVA C. JOHNSON, and DIANE 
PEARL MEJJ30S, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and COMMISSIONER 
BRENT OVERSON, individually, 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 960212CA 
Priority No. 14 
Defendants/Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court 
Entered April 14, 1995 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Presiding 
DIANE PEARL MEJJ30S 
Appellant - Attorney pro se 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, UT 84092-4212 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Bugden, Collins & Morton 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorney for Appellants Johnsons 
and Culbertson 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
PATRICK F.HOLDEN 
2001 South State Street, S-3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Attorneys for the Board of County Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County 
JAYGURMANKIN 
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic & Savage 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
NICKJ.COLESSIDES 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3303 
Attorneys for Horiuchi and Overson 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
POINT 1 16 
IN NOT PLEADING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR WAIVER AS 
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THEIR ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE RIGHT 
TO CHALLENGE THE TIMELINESS OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
FOR REVIEW [COMPLAINT] REGARDING THE COMMISSION'S 
DECISION TO VACATE NORTH UNION AVENUE. 
POINT H 19 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THE BASIS 
FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE 
REMAND BECAUSE THE APPEALS COURT MAY REVERSE THE 
DISMISSAL WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
POINT IH 22 
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THE COMMISSION MADE THE DECISION TO VACATE 
NORTH UNION AVENUE AT THE MAY 25, 1994 HEARING, AND 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(POINT IE cont.) 
THAT THE DECISION WAS "RENDERED" IMMEDIATELY 
THEREAFTER WHEN DEFENDANTS BLOCKED OFF THE 
ROAD AND ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR UP AND/OR 
ALTER THAT ROAD, THEN PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THAT DECISION IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
POINT IV 25 
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THE DECISION TO VACATE NORTH UNION 
AVENUE WAS NOT "RENDERED" UNTIL THE SIGNING OF A 
VACATION ORDINANCE, THEN THE COURT ERRED IN 
DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE CLAIMS REGARDING THE 
VACATION ORDINANCE. 
A. ORDINANCES NO. 1270 AND NO. 1275 ARE BOTH 
INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTY TO 
STRICTLY FOLLOW THE ENABLING LEGISLATION 26 
B. BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED NO NOTICE OF THE 
ADOPTION AND SIGNING OF THE VACATION ORDINANCE, 
AND BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ILLEGALLY BLOCKED OFF 
AND ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR OUT AND/OR ALTER 
NORTH UNION AVENUE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF 
EITHER ORDINANCE, THE PURPORTED VACATION OF THE 
ROAD IS ANULLITY 28 
C. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AFTER RECEIVING 
DEFENDANTS' ADMISSIONS THAT THEY ILLEGALLY 
VACATED NORTH UNION AVENUE. IN SO DOING, THE 
TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY TRANSFERRED THE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCEDURE AND NOTICE FROM 
THE "RESPONSIBLE BODY" TO THE PLAINTIFFS 29 
CONCLUSION 31 
FOOTNOTES 33 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 40 
ii 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXHIBIT A » Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-808, et. seq. (1994) 
EXHIBIT B » Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (1994) 
EXHIBIT C » Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12, 52 (1994) 
EXHIBIT D » Map illustrating property and road in question. 
EXHIBIT E » Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County. 
913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995) 
EXHIBIT F » March 29, 1995 Bench Ruling (summary judgment) 
EXHIBIT G » April 14, 1995 Order (dismissing Second Amended Complaint) 
EXHIBIT H » May 25, 199,8 County Commission Minutes 
EXHIBIT J » Nelson v.Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) 
EXHIBIT K » Ordinance No. 1270 
EXHIBIT L » Ordinance No. 1275 
m 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689P.2d 1 (Utah 1984) 19 
Asavv.Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Utah 1988) 2 
Berry bv and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 39 
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) 19 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) 2 
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945) 21 
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn.. 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.) 2 
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County. 
913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995) 3, 24, 26, 38 
Madsenv.Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 2 
Masters v. Worslev. 777P.2d499, 500-501 (Utah App. 1989) 37 
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1990) 37 
Nelson v. Provo Citv. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) 16, 28, 29, 33 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States. Inc. 
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 37 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 2 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983^ ) 19 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808 to 810 (1994) 2, 3, 16, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 39 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001 (1994) 2, 3, 23, 24, 25, 39 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Nos. 8, 12, 52 (1994) 2,17, 18, 19,21, 33, 34,36 
iv 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE 
JOHNSON, EVA C. JOHNSON, and DIANE 
PEARL MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and COMMISSIONER 
BRENT OVERSON, individually, 
Defendants/Appellees 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err in allowing defendants to allege that plaintiffs 
had not filed their Verified Complaint or their Amended Complaint within the 30-day 
time limitation outlined in the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001, although 
defendants had not pleaded waiver or statute of limitations in their Answer? 
2. Issue: Does the trial court's failure to articulate a true basis for summary 
judgment require reversal? 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err in apparently concluding that the decision 
regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue was not "rendered" until the County 
Commission adopted and published the "corrected" vacation ordinance No. 1275, in 
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August, 1994? 
4. Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims 
relating to Ordinance No. 1275, after apparently concluding that the decision regarding 
the vacation of North Union Avenue was not rendered until the County Commission 
adopted and published the "corrected" vacation ordinance No. 1275, in August, 1994? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of 
law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this 
court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions." Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Madsen 
v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn.. 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-1102 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
"This same lack of deference applies to the trial court's interpretation of statutes, which 
likewise poses a question of law." Bonham. 788 P.2d at 499; accord Asay v. Watkins, 
751 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Utah 1988). 
This Court is to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
appellants. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808 to 810 (1994); Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001 (1994); 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Nos. 8,12, 52 (1994) [Copies of these provisions of law 
2 
and rules of procedure are included in the Addendum as Exhibits A, B and C, 
respectively.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 25, 1995, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to vacate or close all 
of North Union Avenue between 1000 East and 1300 East, the county road which was and 
is the sole access to plaintiffs' property and the two homes on that property. R. 476-480, 
516. [A map showing the configuration of the streets and property at issue in the instant 
case is attached hereto as Exhibit D of the Addendum.] This action was taken at the 
request of Hermes Associates, a development company which was building a shopping 
center/redevelopment project in the area. R. 489-491. Shortly thereafter, defendants 
closed this road to public travel. R. 517. [The factual and legal history of this project is 
more fiilly set forth in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County. 913 P.2d 
723, 727 (Utah 1995), a copy of which is included in the Addendum of this brief as 
Exhibit E.] 
On June 20, 1994, plaintiffs filed suit under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808 to 810 
(1994) and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (1994), alleging that the vacation of their public 
right-of way was illegal, and seeking injunctive relief from the court. R. 1-22, 29-34. On 
July 7, 1994, the Court heard plaintiffs9 motion for injunctive relief and denied the same. 
R. 748A, et. seq. At that hearing, defendants did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint was 
not filed timely, nor did they allege that the decision to vacate/close North Union Avenue 
had not yet been rendered. Instead, they argued that the decision had been made legally, 
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and offered as evidence a draft of the unsigned vacation ordinance [R. 68-69], 
photographs of the closed road [R. 796-798], and testimony that the road vacation would 
not affect access to plaintiffs' property.[R. 798-799] 
Beginning in June, 1994, defendants allowed Hermes to tear out North Union 
Avenue east of plaintiffs5 property. R. 517. On July 13, 1994, more than seven weeks 
after the public hearing, defendants adopted and signed Ordinance No. 1270, the road 
vacation ordinance. R. 481-485. This ordinance differed substantively from the decision 
voted upon at the the May 25th hearing. Although plaintiffs had akeady filed a "petition 
of review" (verified complaint) regarding the road vacation, defendants did not notify 
either plaintiffs or the court of this hearing or the adoption and publication of this 
ordinance.1 R. 581. 
On or about July 14, 1994, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint challenging the 
legality of the road vacation. R. 89-112. On July 27, 1994, defendants filed their Answer 
to this Amended Complaint. R. 113-120. In this Answer, defendants did not allege that 
the decision to vacate North Union Avenue had not yet been rendered, they did not 
challenge the timing or manner of plaintiffs' complaint, nor did they plead as an 
affirmative defense either statute of limitations or waiver. 
On August 10, 1994, without notice to plaintiffs [R. 581] or the court,2 defendants 
held a hearing and adopted another vacation ordinance, Ordinance No. 1275, called the 
"corrected" vacation ordinance. This ordinance made technical corrections in some of the 
legal descriptions used in Ordinance No. 1270. R. 481-485. 
4 
In January 30, 1995, the Court held a hearing to decide, inter alia, whether 
plaintiffs could file a Second Amended Complaint to include allegations regarding the 
County's refusal to enforce their roadway standards, zoning standards, the the express 
terms of Hermes' conditional use permit. Plaintiffs also asked for damages. R. 818, et. 
seq. During this hearing, defendants for the first time questioned the timeliness of 
plaintiffs' challenge to the road vacation, claiming that plaintiffs should have filed their 
complaint within 30 days after the adoption in August of the "corrected" vacation 
ordinance, No. 1275. R. 836-838. The Court discussed this issue briefly, and then ruled 
that plaintiffs could file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted. R. 294-295, 
843-844. 
On or about February 27, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 326-328. On March 
29, 1995, the court held a hearing on both defendants' and plaintiffs' motions. R. 859, et. 
seq. Judge Iwasaki, ruling from the bench [R. 846-853], dismissed plaintiffs' complaint 
without prejudice, except as to "the vacation ordinance," which Judge Iwasaki said was 
subject to his "previous order." R. 851. [The Minute Entry for 3/29/95 states that the 
entire matter was dismissed without prejudice. R. 637] (A copy of the Bench Ruling is 
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit F.) 
On April 6, 1995, defendants submitted a proposed order relating to the March 
29th hearing. This order dismissed with prejudice "plaintiffs' claims as contained within 
plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating to ... ordinance number 1275 (corrected)," 
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and dismissed without prejudice all of plaintiffs' "other claims as asserted in plaintiffs' 
second amended complaint..." Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this order and requested a 
hearing on that Objection. R. 639-641, 642-643. 
On April 14, 1995, without ruling on plaintiffs' objection and without notifying 
plaintiffs, the Court signed defendants' order. R. 647-649. [A copy of this Order is 
included in the Addendum an Exhibit G.] The Court issued no ruling or Conclusions of 
Law explaining the reason for dismissing with prejudice some of plaintiffs' claims, nor 
did the Court identify with any specificity which claims were "relating to ... ordinance 
number 1275 (corrected)." On May 18, 1995, by way of Minute Entry, the court denied 
plaintiffs' Request for Hearing and Objection and instructed defendants' counsel to 
prepare the order. R. 652-652. On September 26, 1995, the court signed the order 
denying plaintiffs' Objection and Request for Hearing. R. 701-701. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs are owners of eight parcels of property and two homes located in 
Union, unincorporated Salt Lake County, first platted in 1857. R. 1, 418. Since that time, 
the sole access to this property and those homes has been North Union Avenue, a county 
road. R. 516. That road was 33 feet wide, had been a platted road for more than 100 
years, and provided plaintiffs with access to 900 East and 1300 East. R. 2. The addresses 
for the two homes are 1072 East North Union Avenue and 1078 East North Union 
Avenue. R. 418, 516. 
2. In 1991, Hermes proposed to the Salt Lake County Commission that they 
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expand The Family Center as a redevelopment project, complete with public funding and 
the use of eminent domain. Eventually, Hermes included plaintiffs' property and North 
Union Avenue within the proposed boundaries of their shopping center expansion. R. 467. 
3. In February, 1994, the Commission, by a vote of 2-to-l, adopted a contract 
with Hermes regarding the dispersal of lands and funding under the aegis of the 
redevelopment law. In that contract, the County Commission, sitting as the 
Redevelopment Agency Board of Directors, contracted to seek the vacation of the public 
rights-of way located within the redevelopment project area, including North Union 
Avenue where it accessed plaintiffs' property. The contract also included a provision 
requiring Hermes to defend in court all actions taken by the county which might result in 
the loss of access and inverse condemnation of plaintiffs' property. R. 785. 
4. On February 15, 1994, Hermes filed a Petition for Street Vacation, seeking 
the vacation of, inter alia, North Union Avenue as it accessed plaintiffs' property. R. 489. 
5. In April, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved a 
conditional use permit for Hermes shopping center. R. 467. 
6. On May 25, 1994, defendants voted to vacate North Union Avenue between 
1000 East and 1300 East, except for except a 25-foot wide portion of the road directly in 
front (north) of plaintiffs' property. That 25' x 250' strip was "closed." This portion of 
the road was closed rather than (totally) vacated so that title to the half of the road property 
would not accrue to plaintiffs. R. 4-5, 476-480. [A copy of the minutes for this hearing 
are included in the Addendum as Exhibit H.] 
7. This motion as passed included the vacation of eight feet of the public right-
7 
of-way in front of plaintiffs' property. However, instead of that eight feet of road 
accruing half to each abutting landowner, defendants specified that all eight feet would 
be vacated from the north side of North Union Avenue and would accrue only to Hermes. 
This deprived plaintiffs of approximately 1000 square feet of property. R. 6, 476-480. 
8. This vote by the defendants created a 25 foot x 250 foot closed public 
roadway that had no outlet to any other roadway. R. 5, 476-480. 
9. Plaintiffs did not receive the required notice regarding the action taken at 
the May 25th hearing, nor did they receive any type of notification regarding any of the 
actions subsequently taken by the Commissioners which directly affected their property. 
R. 581. 
10. On or about June 20, 1994, plaintiffs filed with the trial court a complaint 
which, inter alia, alleged that the vacation ordinance adopted by the Commission was 
illegal as to the actions taken regarding plaintiffs' property and the easement and access 
thereto. R. 1-22. The complaint also asked the court to review the question of access to 
plaintiffs' property, and further asked the court to enjoin defendants from vacating the 
road until the question of reasonable ingress and egress could be decided. After plaintiffs 
filed this complaint, defendants did not inform either plaintiffs or the court that they had 
not yet signed an ordinance and did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint (petition for 
review) was not filed timely or properly. In fact, defendants argued that the vacation 
ordinance was legal, and included a copy of the unsigned ordinance as evidence. R. 68-
69. 
11. On or about June 24, 1994, defendants, by way of letter, tendered defense 
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of this lawsuit and of the County's actions to Hermes Associates. Subsequently, Hermes' 
attorney, Nick Colessides, who had represented Hermes throughout the redevelopment 
and planning and zoning processes, made an appearance as counsel for the County and 
the individual Commissioners. R. 785. 
12. Starting in June, 1994, defendants allowed Hermes and their representatives 
to block off and tear out North Union Avenue east of plaintiffs' property. R. 517. 
13. On or about July 7, 1994, the court heard plaintiffs' motion for an 
injunction and denied the same. R. 748A, et. seq. The court stated that this denial was 
based solely on plaintiffs' failure to show evidence of irreparable harm, and that the 
ruling was not a reflection on the merits of the complaint. R. 750. At that hearing, 
defendants did not allege that plaintiffs' complaint was not filed timely, nor did they 
allege that the decision to vacate/close North Union Avenue had not yet been rendered. 
Instead, they argued that the decision had been made legally, and offered as evidence a 
draft of the unsigned vacation ordinance [R. 68-69], photographs of the closed road [R. 
796-798], and testimony that the road vacation would not adversely affect access to 
plaintiffs' property. R. 798-799. 
14. On July 13, 1994, more than seven weeks after voting on the 
vacation/closure, defendants held a hearing and voted to sign and publish Ordinance No. 
1270, vacating or closing North Union Avenue. R. 481-485. This ordinance was 
substantively different from the action voted on by the Commission on May 25th in that 
it established a 25-foot public right-of-way to the "south" [west] of plaintiffs' property, 
rather than a private shared easement as had been voted on at the May 25 hearing. 
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Although plaintiffs had akeady filed a "petition of review" (verified complaint) regarding 
the road vacation, defendants did not notify either plaintiffs1 or the court of this hearing 
or the adoption and publication of this ordinance. R. 581. 
15. On or about July 14, 1994, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that 
continued allege the illegality of the road vacation decision as it involved plaintiffs' 
easement and property, and asked the court to review the question of access to plaintiffs' 
property. R. 89-112. 
16. On July 27, 1994, defendants filed their Answer to this amended complaint. 
R. 113-120. In this Answer, defendants did not allege that the decision to vacate North 
Union Avenue had not yet been rendered, they did not challenge the timing or manner of 
plaintiffs' complaint, nor did they plead as an affirmative defense either statute of 
limitations or waiver. 
17. During the last week of July, 1994, defendants took depositions from all 
four plaintiffs and did not assail the timing or manner of plaintiffs' petition for review. 
This is the first time plaintiffs were informed that the adopted vacation ordinance, 
Ordinance No. 1270, was substantively different from the decision voted upon at the May 
25, 1994 hearing. R. 552. 
18. On or about August 10, 1994, the Commission held another hearing 
regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue. The Commission adopted and signed 
what defendants call the "corrected Vacation Ordinance," No. 1275. R. 486-492. This 
ordinance did not differ substantively in its effect on plaintiffs' access from Ordinance 
No. 1270, which defendants published in July and which plaintiffs appealed. Rather, this 
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ordinance made technical corrections in some of the legal descriptions used in Ordinance 
No. 1270. Plaintiffs were not notified that the County was holding another hearing on 
the vacation of their road. Although plaintiffs had filed timely an amended complaint 
with the trial court, and defendants had answered, neither the plaintiffs2 nor the court 
were notified that defendants had signed a "corrected Vacation Ordinance." R. 552. 
19. In August and September, 1994, defendants and Hermes blocked off and 
tore out North Union Avenue west of plaintiffs9 property, between 1000 East and the 
northwest corner of plaintiffs' property. R. 518 They replaced North Union Avenue with 
a road that did not meet the minimum standards outlined in the County's Standards for 
Roadway Development. R. 463-466. This road was dedicated to the County and was 
eventually designated as 1070 East. Since that time, fire trucks, garbage trucks, snow 
plows and other large vehicles can't access plaintiffs' homes or property. R. 512, 518-
523. 
20. In October, 1994, Hermes built one of their retail buildings into the 25-foot 
public right-of-way established by Ordinance Nos. 1270 and 1275. Plaintiffs, through 
counsel, notified the County of this breach. R. 473-474. The County responded only that 
there was a problem but refused to enforce the public right-of-way and their roadway 
standards. R. 475. 
21. On December 19, 1994, plaintiffs, through counsel, served defendants with 
a notice of claim regarding damages to plaintiffs caused by defendants' continuing 
refusal to enforce the public right-of-way as outlined in Ordinance No. 1275 (and No. 
1270). R. 493-495. 
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22. On January 30, 1995, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for leave 
to amend their complaint to include allegations regarding the County's refusal to enforce 
their roadway and zoning standards and the express terms of Hermes' conditional use 
permit. R. 818, et seq. During that hearing, defendants told the court that plaintiffs could 
not continue to assail "the validity of the vacation ordinance" because plaintiffs had not 
re-filed their amended complaint 30 days after the county signed the "Corrected Vacation 
Ordinance" in August, 1994. Defendants argued that the decision to vacate North Union 
Avenue was not "rendered" until defendants signed the "corrected" vacation ordinance. 
R. 836-838. Notwithstanding, Judge Iwasaki ruled that plaintiffs could file the second 
amended complaint as they had submitted to the court, and signed an order effecting that 
ruling. R. 294-295, 843-844. 
23. On February 3, 1995, plaintiffs filed notices of claim with the County 
regarding damages to plaintiffs caused by defendants' continuing refusal to enforce their 
roadway and zoning standards, and the conditional use permit which the County had 
issued to Hermes. R. 493-503. 
24. On February 13, 1995, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint 
which continued to allege the illegality of the road vacation as regarded plaintiffs' 
property, easement and access, and continued to ask the court to review the question of 
access. Plaintiffs added claims regarding defendants' failure to enforce their ordinances 
and permits, and, for the first time, notified the court of plaintiffs' intention to seek both 
compensatory and punitive damages. R. 296-311. 
25. On or about February 23, 1995, defendants filed an answer to plaintiffs' 
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second amended complaint. R. 312-323. 
26. On or about February 27, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. In this pleading, 
defendants argued that plaintiffs could not continue to challenge the legality of the road 
vacation because they had "promised" the Court they "would not challenge the validity of 
the Vacation Ordinance as passed and adopted by the Board." Defendants also argued 
that plaintiffs couldn't claim damages for the actions taken by the County. R. 329-345. 
27. On March 1, 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, 
asking the court to order the County Commissioners to enforce their roadway and zoning 
standards and the conditional use permit granted to Hermes. Plaintiffs also asked the court 
to issue an injunction against any building adjacent to plaintiffs' property until the 
question of reasonable access could be reviewed by the court. R. 377-416. 
28. On March 29, 1995, the court held a hearing on both defendants' and 
plaintiffs5 motions. R. 859, et. seq. At that hearing, defendants told the Court that during 
the hearing on the motion to amend, Judge Iwasaki had made plaintiffs promise not to 
challenge the "validity" of the "Corrected" Vacation Ordinance No. 1275, and asked the 
court to dismiss the remainder of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Iwasaki, ruling from the bench [R. 846-853], 
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice, except as to "the vacation ordinance," 
which Judge Iwasaki said was subject to his "previous order." R. 851. (The Minute Entry 
for 3/29/95 states that the entire matter was dismissed without prejudice. R. 637) 
29. On April 6, 1995, defendants submitted a proposed order relating to the 
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March 29th hearing. This order dismissed with prejudice "plaintiffs' claims as 
contained within plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating to ... ordinance number 
1275 (corrected)," and dismissed without prejudice all of plaintiffs' "other claims as 
asserted in plaintiffs' second amended complaint..." R. 647-649. The Court submitted 
neither a ruling nor Conclusions of Law explaining the basis for dismissing certain of 
plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this order and 
requested a hearing on that Objection. R. 639-641, 642-643. 
30. On April 14, 1995, without ruling on plaintiffs' objection and without 
notifying plaintiffs, the Court signed and entered defendants' order. R. 647-649. 
31. On May 18, 1995, by way of Minute Entry, the court denied plaintiffs' 
Request for Hearing and Objection and instructed defendants' counsel to prepare the 
order. R. 652-653. 
32. On September 26, 1995, the Court signed the order denying plaintiffs' 
Objection and Request for Hearing. R. 701-702. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
By not pleading statute of limitations or waiver as an affirmative defense in their 
Answer, defendants waived the right to challenge the timeliness of plaintiffs' complaints 
regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue. Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure require 
that motions resulting in the dismissal of a complaint must be made by written motion 
with written notice. The trial court erred in allowing the defendants to raise the 
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timeliness defense outside the pleadings and in an untimely fashion. 
POINT II 
While the failure of the trial court to articulate the basis for granting summary 
judgment is a violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and may have resulted in a 
denial of plaintiffs' Constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts, it may 
not be necessary for the appeals court to correct this error by remanding the case to the 
trial court to enter a ruling or conclusions of law. Because the issues involved in this 
appeal represent questions of law only, the Court of Appeals may proceed to issue 
opinions without further discussion from the trial court. 
POINT in 
If the Court of Appeals finds, contrary to the apparent conclusion of the trial court, 
as a matter of law, that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was "rendered" either 
during the May 25, 1994 public hearing, or that the decision was rendered shortly 
thereafter when defendants blocked off the road to public use and allowed Hermes to tear 
out and alter the road, then plaintiffs filed their petition for review of the decision in a 
timely manner, as outlined in Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1994). Under this finding, 
the Court of Appeals should remand this case to the trial court to allow plaintiffs to 
discover and present evidence and legal argument challenging the legality of the road 
vacation decision. 
POINT IV 
If the Court of Appeals finds agrees with the trial court's apparent conclusion that, 
as a matter of law, the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not made until the 
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County Commission adopted and published one or other of the road vacation ordinances, 
then the decision and the ordinances are invalid as a matter of law because of the failure 
of the defendants to follow the procedure for the vacation of a platted road, as outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808, et. seq. 
Under this finding, defendants illegally turned over the public right-of-way to 
Hermes for destruction prior to the adoption of either of the vacation ordinances and 
without having legally vacated that right-of-way, an action which nullifies the decision. 
Further, defendants, inter alia, adopted and published both Ordinance No. 1270 and No. 
1275 long after the 30 days allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(l)(a). Defendants 
also failed to provide plaintiffs with any written notice of the vacation of this road, an 
action which has already been ruled, by the Utah Court of Appeals, to invalidate the 
vacation ordinance. [See Nelson v. Provo City. 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), a copy of 
which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit J.] 
If the Court of Appeals makes the determination that the vacation of North Union 
Avenue, or any other road, does not take place until the adoption and publication of the 
vacation ordinance, and until abutting landowners have received written notification of 
the road vacation, then the Court of Appeals should conclude that the County 
Commission did not properly vacate North Union Avenue, and should, as they did in 
Nelson, remand this case for further proceedings consistent with that opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN NOT PLEADING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR WAIVER AS AN 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THEIR ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT, DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 
THE TIMELINESS OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW 
[COMPLAINT] REGARDING THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO 
VACATE NORTH UNION AVENUE. 
While the basis for the trial court's ruling dismissing claims relating to Ordinance 
No. 1275 is not clear from the record (because the trial court indicated that the dismissal 
was premised on a prior order which the court never actually made), the defendants 
argued orally to the trial court that the basis for dismissing the claims was that plaintiffs 
were not timely in filing their complaint because the plaintiffs did not file a new 
complaint after the defendants adopted and published Ordinance No. 1275, which made 
technical corrections to the prior ordinance reflecting the defendants' prior decision to 
vacate the road. This argument was not raised in defendants' answer to plaintiffs' 
complaints. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 governs general rules of pleadings in civil cases. 
In subsection (c), the rule provides that affirmative defenses, including the defenses of 
waiver and statute of limitations, must be asserted in responsive pleadings. It states, 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of 
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as 
a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice 
so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper 
designation. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 similarly requires that defenses such as waiver 
and statute of limitations must be raised in responsive pleadings, or in some cases in 
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motions filed prior to responsive pleadings.4 Subsection (b) of rule 12 provides, in 
relevant part, 
... Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in 
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service 
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. 
Subsection (h) of rule 12 reiterates that defenses such as waiver and statutes of 
limitations are waived if not timely raised in responsive pleadings. That subsection states, 
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if 
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense 
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the 
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties 
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall 
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that 
may have been received. 
Utah case law has consistently held that defenses such as waiver and statute of 
limitations are waived if not timely raised in responsive pleadings, and demonstrate the 
trial court's error in allowing the defendants to raise this defense after filing answers to 
plaintiffs amended complaints without raising such a defense. See American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom 689 P.2d 1, 4 and n.7 (Utah 1984)("Statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional 
and can be waived.")(footnote citing Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) omitted); Staker 
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v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983)("The statute of 
limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or 
it is waived, Utah R.Ci.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an amended pleading asserting the 
defense is allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a)."); Bezner v. Continental 
Dry Cleaners. Inc.. 548 P.2d 898, 901 and nn. 4 and 5 (Utah 1976)("[T]he matter of 
waiver is ordinarily an affirmative defense which should be pleaded, or the waiver itself 
is deemed to be waived.")(footnotes citing rules 8(c) and 12(h) omitted). 
In the instant case, plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint and an Amended 
Complaint challenging the legality of the decision to vacate plaintiffs' road. Both 
plaintiffs and defendants conducted discovery and filed various motions. In the middle of 
a hearing to amend their complaint to include actions taken by the County Commission 
subsequent to the decision to vacate the road, defendants, without making a written 
motion and without providing notice to either plaintiffs or the court, suddenly argued that 
the decision to vacate the road had not filed their complaint in a timely fashion. Plaintiffs 
were given no opportunity to prepare for or to properly brief the court on this issue. 
Given that the defendants' claim of waiver or statute of limitations was not 
properly pled in their responsive pleadings, the trial court erred in allowing the defendants 
to raise the defense outside the pleadings and in an untimely fashion. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THE BASIS FOR 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE REMAND 
BECAUSE THE APPEALS COURT MAY REVERSE THE DISMISSAL 
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WITHOUT FURTHER DISCUSSION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court signed and entered an order prepared by counsel for defendants 
which dismissed with prejudice all claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275, despite the fact 
that the trial court had never previously ordered those claims dismissed with or without 
prejudice. The only apparent basis for dismissing these claims was a purported "previous 
order" which never existed. [The only Orders filed in the instant case prior to the Order 
of dismissal was the Order allowing plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint.] At 
the hearing on the plaintiffs9 motion for leave to amend the complaint, defendants argued 
something to the effect that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not rendered 
until defendants adopted the "corrected" road vacation ordinance, Ordinance No. 1275, 
more than twelve weeks after the hearing on the road vacation. Defendants suggested to 
the court that plaintiffs should be prohibited from pursuing defects in Ordinance No. 1275, 
because plaintiffs had failed to file a separate appeal after that ordinance was enacted. The 
trial court discussed this argument, but deferred ruling on it. The trial court ruled only that 
plaintiffs would be allowed to file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted, 
including their continuing claims that the decision to and manner in which North Union 
Avenue was vacated was illegal. The court then signed an order effecting that ruling. 
At a subsequent hearing, the trial court ordered plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint dismissed without prejudice, requiring them to exhaust their administrative 
remedies, but excepted claims regarding Ordinance No. 1275 from this ruling, indicating 
that the court had already ruled on those claims. Counsel for defendants drafted an order 
indicating that claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275 were dismissed with prejudice, and 
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the trial court signed this order over the objection of the defendants. 
The trial court's order dismissing the claims pertaining to Ordinance No. 1275 
violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process of law, because the plaintiffs had no notice 
that the trial court would or did decide the issue, and no full and fair opportunity to be 
heard prior to the making of the purported decision. See e ^ Christiansen v. Harris, 163 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(discussing general contours of due process, especially under the 
state constitution). 
The trial court also violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which requires trial 
courts to enter written decisions in resolving motions for summary judgment.5 
Subsection (a) of that rule provides in relevant part, "The court shall, however, issue a 
brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground." 
While the trial court's order granting summary judgment indicates that dismissal 
of the claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275 is based on the prior order of the court, the 
court entered no prior order dismissing the claims.6 
The trial court's failure to clearly articulate the basis for dismissing the claims, 
while a violation of rule 52, does not require reversal on this basis because this Court can 
assess the illegality of the dismissal of the claims on appeal without further discussion by 
the trial court. Review of issues 1, 2 and 3 demonstrates that there was no proper basis 
for dismissal of the claims. However, it is noteworthy that the trial court's failure to ever 
clearly explain a basis for dismissal of the claims strips the trial court's ruling of the 
presumption of correctness normally afforded to rulings of the trial courts.8 
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POINT HI 
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THE COMMISSION MADE THE DECISION TO VACATE 
NORTH UNION AVENUE AT THE MAY 25, 1994 HEARING, AND 
THAT THE DECISION WAS "RENDERED" IMMEDIATELY 
THEREAFTER WHEN DEFENDANTS BLOCKED OFF THAT ROAD 
AND ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR UP AND/OR ALTER THAT 
ROAD, THEN PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR PETITION FOR REVIEW 
OF THAT DECISION IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
The trial court apparently adopted the argument of the defendants that plaintiffs' 
claims regarding Ordinance No. 1275 were subject to dismissal with prejudice because 
the plaintiffs did not file a new complaint appealing from Ordinaace No. 1275 within 30 
days of the enactment of this ordinance. The trial court apparently adopted the 
defendants9 arguments that the decision to vacate the road was not "rendered" and 
appealable until Ordinance No. 1275 was enacted. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810 governs the actions of the defendants at issue here, 
the vacation of roads. It provides, 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this 
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition. 
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither 
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may 
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot. 
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation, 
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order, 
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible 
body or officer. 
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county 
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recorder in which the land is located. 
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's 
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001. 
It is critical to note that the statute governing vacation of roads allows for the 
appeal of the decision on the petition for vacation, rather than of the adoption of the 
ordinances. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810(2), supra. 
The statute governing land use appeals, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001(1994), 
similarly provides for appeals of decisions rendered, rather than ordinances enacted. It 
states, 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until they have exhausted their administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of 
the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
The trial court apparently accepted the defendants' argument that the decision to 
vacate the road was not "rendered" until the successive Ordinance No. 1275 was formally 
enacted. 
In so interpreting the governing statutes, the trial court contravened fundamental 
rules of statutory construction requiring courts to follow the plain meaning of legislation, 
and to give normal meaning to each word enacted by the legislature.9 These rules of 
statutory construction are essential to the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
government powers,10 because they insure that courts apply the laws enacted by the 
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legislatures, rather than legislating from the bench.11 
The decision rendered in the instant matter and subject to the appeal filed in the 
trial court was the decision to vacate the road, which was made and actually carried out, 
long before Ordinance No. 1275 was enacted. 
The governing statutes allow for the appeals of decisions, and do not require that 
the commissioners' decisions be enacted into formal ordinances to be appealable. While 
the statute governing the vacation of roads specifically discusses the enactment of 
ordinances in the road vacation process, in discussing appeals, the statute speaks in terms 
of appeals of decisions, not of ordinances. Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810. The statute 
governing such appeals, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001, similarly speaks in terms of 
appeals from decisions rendered, not decisions enacted into ordinances. Common usage 
of the term "rendered" does not encompass the notion of enactment into formal 
legislation.12 Had the legislature intended for appeals from the activities of the 
commissioners to be limited to decisions formalized in ordinances, the legislature could 
and would have specified that appeals lie from ordinances, rather than decisions. See 
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995).9 
In apparently concluding that the decision to vacate the road was not "rendered" 
when it was voted upon at the May 25, 1994 hearing nor was it "rendered" when the road 
was altered and/or destroyed, but was as a matter of law "rendered" when the most recent 
ordinance was enacted, the trial court diverged from the plain meaning of the plain 
language of the statutes governing the appeal. 
By allowing the defendants to evade appeal of the road vacation decision via the 
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enactment of a successive ordinance, the trial court effectively denied the plaintiffs their 
rights to appeal and to access to the courts.13 As this case demonstrates, condoning the 
defendants' argument and trial court's ruling would allow defendants to continually 
evade appeal by simply enacting successive amended ordinances, even if such ordinances 
were substantively identical to decisions already appealed from. Such gamesmanship 
would portend litigation that would end only at the exhaustion of the resources of 
plaintiffs, and would be fundamentally inconsistent with the plaintiffs' rights to due 
process of law and access to the courts. 
Obviously, the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was effectively rendered at 
the time the actions seemingly allowed by the road vacation (the alteration, replacement 
and destruction of North Union Avenue) commenced or were put into effect. This 
process was initiated in early June, shortly after the public hearing, and continued without 
regard for the adoption, signing and publication of the two road vacation ordinances. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint within 30 days of the "rendering" of this decision, at the 
May 25th hearing or when destruction of the road began, and in so doing, fulfilled the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §17-27-1001. 
POINT IV 
IF THE APPEALS COURT DETERMINES THAT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THE DECISION TO VACATE NORTH UNION AVENUE WAS 
NOT "RENDERED" UNTIL THE SIGNING OF A VACATION 
ORDINANCE, THEN THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING WITH 
PREJUDICE CLAIMS REGARDING THE VACATION ORDINANCE. 
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If the trial court concluded that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was not 
legally enacted until the defendants had adopted and published Ordinance No. 1275, then 
the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims as to the validity of the road 
ordinance. Upon making that determination, the trial court should have concluded that 
the County Commission did not properly vacate the road and that both of the vacation 
ordinances were invalid and illegal. 
A. ORDINANCES NO. 1270 AND NO. 1275 ARE BOTH 
INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTY TO 
STRICTLY FOLLOW THE ENABLING LEGISLATION. 
As is required in the adoption of all ordinances, when adopting an ordinance to 
vacate a public, platted road (particularly one which is still in use), strict adherence to the 
enabling legislation is required. For instance, in the redevelopment case associated with 
the instant case, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 913 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1995), the Supreme Court again affirmed the principal of strict adherence. 
Because area redevelopment is serious action that may be in 
derogation of individual property rights, strict compliance with enabling 
legislation is required to enact ordinance setting up redevelopment plan. 
Id. at 723 (citation omitted) 
Certainly, the vacation of the public right-of-way which is and has always been the 
sole access to plaintiffs' property is an action that may be in derogation of plaintiffs' 
individual property rights and is as as serious an action as area redevelopment. 
Consequently, the government agency taking that action is required to strictly comply 
with the enabling legislation. 
26 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810 governs the actions of the defendants at issue here, 
the vacation of roads. It provides, 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this 
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition. 
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither 
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may 
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot. 
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation, 
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order, 
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible 
body or officer. 
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county 
recorder in which the land is located. 
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's 
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001. 
The "public hearing required by this part" was, presumably, the hearing held on 
May 25, 1994, as that was the only hearing for which plaintiffs received notice. Both 
vacation Ordinances No. 1270 (adopted on July 13, 1994) and No. 1275 (adopted on 
August 10, 1994) were adopted more than 30 days after the public hearing. This was in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(l)(a), which requires that the vacation be 
approved within 30 days after the public hearing. It is defendants, not plaintiffs, who 
have failed to timely meet their 30-day statute-of-limitations. The result of having failed 
to strictly comply with the enabling legislation is that the vacation ordinances, both 1270 
and 1275, are invalid ab initio. Again, in Johnson, the Supreme Court concluded that, 
because the RDA failed to comply with one of the provisions of The Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act (1993), the "ordinance in question is invalid." Id. at 731. 
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B. BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED NO NOTICE OF THE 
ADOPTION AND SIGNING OF THE VACATION ORDINANCE, 
AND BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ILLEGALLY BLOCKED OFF AND 
ALLOWED HERMES TO TEAR OUT AND/OR ALTER NORTH 
UNION AVENUE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF EITHER 
ORDINANCE, THE PURPORTED VACATION OF THE ROAD IS 
A NULLITY. 
It is an undisputed fact that the County closed North Union Avenue and that 
defendants allowed Hermes to begin the process of tearing out that road, at least two 
months before the adoption of Ordinance No. 1275. Defendants' argument that the 
decision to vacate the road was not properly rendered until the adoption of that ordinance 
is a candid admission on their part that the Commissioners intentionally allowed the 
destruction of the public right-of-way long before they had vacated the road. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently ruled on a case involving the vacation of 
a public road, and the facts of that case are strikingly similar to the instant case. In Nelson 
v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), this Court invalidated the road vacation 
because of untimely and insufficient notice. 
Roadway was not properly vacated, where city failed to notify 
abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute 
until after purported vacation. 
Id. at 35, citation omitted. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs were notified of a public hearing on this issue, but 
were never notified of any of the subsequent actions taken regarding the vacation of their 
road. The Ordinances which were ultimately adopted to enact the road vacation differed 
in substance and effect from what was discussed at the public hearing. Defendants (in an 
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untimely fashion) adopted two different road vacation ordinances, but provided no notice 
whatsoever of the underlying hearings or of the decisions made during those hearing 
regarding the vacation of the road. Additionally, the adoption of these ordinances 
occurred after the fact, when much of North Union Avenue was nothing but a memory. 
"Thus, City's notice was not only insufficient, it was untimely. As a result, any purported 
vacation of the Roadway is a nullity." Nelson at 38. This Court's decision in the Nelson 
case, "to reverse the court's conclusion that City properly vacated the Roadway and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion," is also appropriate in this 
action. [Again, because the trial court did not articulate the basis for granting defendants' 
summary judgment motion, and because this represents an issue of law, not fact, the 
Court of Appeals is not restricted from rendering an opinion on the process leading to the 
adoption of the vacation ordinances. See footnote 8, below.] 
C. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AFTER RECEIVING DEFENDANTS' 
ADMISSIONS THAT THEY ILLEGALLY VACATED NORTH 
UNION AVENUE. IN SO DOING, THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY TRANSFERRED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PROCEDURE AND NOTICE FROM THE "RESPONSIBLE BODY" 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Again, Utah Code Ann. §17-27-808, et. seq. governs the actions of the defendants 
in the vacation of roads. Section -810 provides, 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this 
part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition. 
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither 
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the proposed 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the 
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vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may 
vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot. 
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation, 
alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order, 
or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible 
body or officer. 
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county 
recorder in which the land is located. 
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's 
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001. 
The County Commission is the "responsible body" referenced in this statute. 
They, the defendants in this action, are responsible for following the procedure outlined 
in the enabling ordinance, making the vacation decision, holding public hearings, 
providing adequate and timely notice, adopting and recording the vacation ordinance, and 
so forth. It is clear from the plain language of the legislation that the burden of 
responsibility for the actions taken to vacate a public road rests squarely on the shoulders 
of the County Commission. 
However, when the Commission admitted to the trial court that the decision to 
vacate North Union Avenue was not made until the adoption of Ordinance No. 1275, 
although they had effected that road vacation months prior to the adoption of that 
ordinance, the Court inexplicably dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. In so doing, the trial 
court effectively, and incorrectly, transferred the responsibility for procedure to the 
plaintiffs away from the Commission. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on the road vacation decision when defendants told 
plaintiffs that the decision had been made. When defendants held additional hearings on 
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the issue, and when they adopted the road vacation ordinances, defendants did not 
provide any notice to plaintiffs of those decisions. Nevertheless, defendants and then the 
trial court expected plaintiffs to be responsible for actions and decisions of which they 
had no knowledge, and for which the enabling legislation clearly anticipated the County 
Commission should be responsible. The trial court erred in shifting this burden of 
responsibility by dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims regarding the road vacation 
ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants waived the right to challenge the timeliness of plaintiffs' complaints 
by failing to plead timeliness as an affirmative defense. This Court, then, must make the 
determination of when the road vacation was properly enacted and rendered. 
If this Court determines that the decision on the road vacation was properly made 
at the May 25, 1994 hearing, then plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to reverse the 
trial court's dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims relating to Ordinance No. 1275, and 
to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
or Second Amended Complaint. 
If this Court makes the determination that the decision to vacate North Union 
Avenue was not rendered until the adoption and publication of the vacation ordinance, 
whether it's No. 1270 or No. 1275, then plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to 
reverse the trial court's dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims relating to Ordinance No. 
1275, and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 1996. 
a 
t)iane Pearl Meibos 
Attorney pro se 
vOco^tp-t T^-A 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MOR; 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Culbq 
and Eva and Blaine Johnson 
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FOOTNOTES 
This lack of notice, in and of itself, invalidates the road vacation ordinance, as per 
the ruling of this Court in Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), in which 
this Court invalidated the road vacation because of untimely and insufficient notice, 
Roadway was not properly vacated, where City failed to notify 
abutting landowners, or to notify its citizens generally pursuant to statute 
until after purported vacation. 
Id. at 35, citation omitted. 
See footnote 1, above. 
a
 Rule No. 8 states in full, 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an 
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the 
adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials 
shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good 
faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it 
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in 
good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his 
denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally 
deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly 
admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by 
general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly 
designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, 
if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
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(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not 
denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive 
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical 
forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately 
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When 
two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently 
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or 
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
^ Rule No. 12 provides in its entirety, 
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days after 
the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly 
provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading stating a 
cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service 
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 
twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty 
days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion 
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by 
order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the 
merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the courts 
action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion 
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
34 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56. 
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for 
judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before 
trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and 
determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required 
to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before 
interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained 
of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed 
within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it 
deems just. 
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by 
a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may 
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party 
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not 
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as 
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does 
not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 
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can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading After Denial of a Motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the 
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such 
motion. 
(j) Security for Costs of a Nonresident Plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to 
require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable 
necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with 
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or 
agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of Failure to File Undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon 
motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
D
 Rule 52 states in full, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear 
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in 
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry 
of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial 
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pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without 
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the Trial 
Court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue 
of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
In assessing the adequacy of the trial court's order granting summary judgment, 
this Court is not limited to the written order of the court, but may review all findings 
expressed in court documents and in transcripts of bench rulings. See e ^ Merriam v. 
Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App. 1990)(in child custody decision, Court 
indicated, "[0]n review we are not limited to written findings, and may properly examine 
findings expressed solely from the bench or contained in other court documents, such as 
court memoranda."). 
1
 See Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 500-501 (Utah App. 1989)(noting that trial 
court's failure to comply with Rule 52 is normally reversible error, but declining to 
remand where the interests of judicial economy called on the Court to simply reverse the 
trial court on the merits of the trial court's order granting summary judgment). 
For instance, in Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc.. 
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), the court criticized the trial court's ruling, stating, 
Such a blanket statement provides us with no guidance as to the trial couifs 
reasoning. It therefore does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which requires trial judges to issue brief written 
statements of their grounds for granting summary judgment when multiple 
grounds are presented. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). Although failure to issue 
a statement of grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances, 
we take this opportunity to remind trial judges that the presumption of 
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings "has little operative effect 
when members of this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning 
because of the cryptic nature of its ruling." 
Id. at 979 n.4 (citation omitted). 
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For instance, in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 
913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court explained, 
The primary rule guiding us in statutory interpretation is that we 
give effect to the intent of the legislature. To discover that intent, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute. "Unambiguous language in [a] 
statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." In 
construing a statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was used 
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading 
is unreasonably confused or inoperable." "Only when we find ambiguity in 
the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations." 
...[W]e assume "each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." 
Id. at 727-729 (citations omitted). 
Unlike the federal constitution's implied separation of powers doctrine, the Utah 
Constitution contains an express requirement for separation of government powers. In 
article V section 1, it states, 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
As is explained in section 46.03 of Sutherland, Statutory Construction. 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of statute is 
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts 
owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text 
of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. 
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the 
legislature. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has captured this idea in the 
following language: "It is an elementary proposition that courts only 
determine by construction the scope and intent of the law when the law 
itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a law is plain and within the legislative 
power, it declares itself and nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding 
upon the court as upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to 
say that the law must mean something different from the common import of 
its language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or 
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the 
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government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The 
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or repeal. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
For instance, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term render as follows: 
1: to extract (as lard) by heating 2: DELIVER, GIVE; also: YIELD 3: to 
give in return 4: to do (a service) for another <~aid> 5: to cause to be or 
become: MAKE 6: to reproduce or represent by artistic or verbal means 7: 
TRANSLATE <~ into English> 
LD
 In addition to the statutes providing the plaintiffs' rights to appeal, Utah Code 
Ann. sections 17-27-810 and 1001, Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and 
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I section 7 to the Utah Constitution complements the open courts provision, 
guaranteeing due process of law. See generally Berry by and through Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675-76 (Utah 1985)(interpreting Article I sections 7 and 11 
as requiring fair and equal access to the courts for protection of fundamental rights and 
for remedies for injuries to people, property and reputations). 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A 
17-27-808 COUNTIES 
210 (1952) (interpreting former § 57-5-4 with Rights of owners of abutting land. 
§ 17-5-233 and former § 27-3-3). ' 
A statutory dedication by the filing of plats of -Boundary by acquiescence. 
a subdivision vests a fee title in the municipal- W* 1 ^ ^^y owned street separating prop, 
ity or county to the streets shown therein. e r t y o w n e l d b? t w o parties, the doctrine of 
Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Murray City, 2 Utah boundary by acquiescence could not apply since 
2d 427 277 P2d 798 (1954) e rcQU11"61*161^ that the parties be adjoining" 
landowners was not met. Condas v. Willesen 
Location of streets. 674 R2d 115 (Utah 1983). 
—Present use. —Damages. 
The court rejected as unsound the argument The owner of abutting land is not entitled to 
that streets could not be located on the plat of a damages for the laying of a city water main in a 
township unless the street was already in use. street in a platted subdivision where the per-
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304, 166 mission of the commissioners of the county in 
P.2d 221, judgment set aside on other grounds which the street is situated has been obtained, 
on rehearing, Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 
Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946). 210 (1952). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 22. 
Key Numbers. — Dedication «=» 19(1). 
17-27-808. Vacating or changing a subdivision plat. 
(1) (a) The county legislative body or any other officer that the legislative 
body designates by ordinance may, with or without a petition, consider any 
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment of a subdivision plat, any 
portion of a subdivision plat, or any street, lot, or alley contained in a 
subdivision plat at a public hearing. 
(b) If a petition is filed, the responsible body or officer shall hold the 
public hearing within 45 days after it is filed if: 
(i) the plat change includes the vacation of a public street or alley; 
(ii) any owner within the plat notifies the municipality of their 
objection in writing within ten days of mailed notification; or 
(iii) a public hearing is required because all of the owners in the 
subdivision have not signed the revised plat. 
(2) Any fee owner, as shown on the last county assessment rolls, of land 
within the subdivision that has been laid out and platted as provided in this 
part may, in writing, petition the legislative body to have the plat, any portion 
of it, or any street or lot contained in it, vacated, altered, or amended as 
provided in this section. 
(3) A petition to vacate, alter, or amend an entire plat, a portion of a plat, or 
a street or lot contained in a plat shall include: 
(a) the name and address of all owners of record of the land contained 
in the entire plat; 
(b) the name and address of all owners of record of land adjacent to any 
street that is proposed to be vacated, altered, or amended; and 
(c) the signature of each of these owners who consents to the petition. 
(4) (a) Petitions that lack the consent of all owners referred to in Subsection 
(3) may not be scheduled for consideration at a public hearing before the 
responsible body or officer until the notice required by this part is given. 
(b) The petitioner shall pay the cost of the notice. 
(5) When the responsible body or officer proposes to vacate, alter, or amend 
a subdivision plat, or any street or lot contained in a subdivision plat, they 
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COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17-27-809 
shall consider the issue at a public hearing after giving the notice required by 
this part. 
(6) Petitions to adjust lot lines between adjacent properties may be executed 
upon the recordation of an appropriate deed if: 
(a) no new dwelling lot or housing unit results from the lot line 
adjustment; 
(b) the adjoining property owners consent to the lot line adjustment; 
(c) the lot line adjustment does not result in remnant land that did not 
previously exist; and 
(d) the adjustment does not result in violation of applicable zoning 
requirements. 
History: C. 1953,17-27-808, enacted by L. legislative body in Subsection (l)(b) and for 
1991, ch. 235, § 101; 1995, ch. 179, § 18. "legislative body" in Subsections (4)(a) and (5); 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- added Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (l)(b)(iii) and (6); 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted aor any and made a stylistic change, 
other officer that the legislative body desig- Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
nates by ordinance" in Subsection (l)(a); substi- §
 1 1 0 m a k e 8 the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
tuted "responsible body or officer" for "county 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Failure of Subdi- Blueprint for Local Government Action, 1988 
vision Control in the Western United States: A Utah L. Rev. 569. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statutory history. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304,166 R2d 221. 
The origin of former section in the Laws of C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 60. 
1894 and its later status are given in Hall v. 
17-27-809. Notice of hearing for plat change. 
(1) (a) The responsible body or officer shall give notice of the proposed plat 
change by mailing the notice to all owners referred to in Section 10-9-808, 
addressed to their mailing addresses appearing on the rolls of the county 
assessor of the county in which the land is located. 
(b) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the notice includes: 
(i) a statement that anyone objecting to the proposed plat change 
must file a written objection to the change within ten days of the date 
of the notice; 
(ii) a statement that if no written objections are received by the 
legislative body within the time limit, no public hearing will be held; 
and 
(iii) the date, place, and time when a hearing will be held, if one is 
required, to consider a vacation, alteration, or amendment without a 
petition when written objections are received or to consider any 
petition that does not include the consent of all land owners as 
required by Section 17-27-808. 
(2) If the proposed change involves the vacation, alteration, or amendment 
of a street, the responsible body or officer shall give notice of the date, place, 
and time of the hearing by: 
(a) mailing notice as required in Subsection (1); and 
(b) either: 
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17-27-810 COUNTIES 
(i) publishing the notice once a week for four consecutive weeks 
before the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the county 
in which the land subject to the petition is located; or 
(ii) if there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county, 
post the notice for four consecutive weeks before the hearing in three 
public places in that county. 
History: C. 1953,17-27-809, enacted by L. the beginning of Subsection (1), substituted 
1991, ch. 235, § 102; 1995, ch. 179, § 19. "responsible body or officer'' for "legislative 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- body." 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsec- Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235 
tion (1), adding the provisions specifying the § n o makes the act effective on July 1, 1992* 
contents of the notice and, in Subsection (2) and 
17-27-810. Grounds for vacating or changing a plat. 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by this part, the 
responsible body or officer shall consider the petition. 
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither the public 
nor any person will be materially injured b}/ the proposed vacation, 
alteration, or amendment, and that there is good cause for the vacation, 
alteration, or amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate, 
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot. 
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the vacation, alteration, 
or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, administrative order, or deed 
containing a stamp or mark indicating approval by the responsible body or 
officer. 
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the vacation, 
alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the county recorder in 
which the land is located. 
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or officer's 
decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001. 
History: C. 1953,17-27-810, enacted by L. in four places, added Subsection (l)(c), and 
1991, ch. 235, § 103; 1995, ch. 179, § 20. redesignated former Subsection (l)(c) as Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- section (l)(d). 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "re- Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
sponsible body or officer" for "legislative body" § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Civil liability. sovereign, and a violation thereof did not nec-
The purpose of former §§ 57-5-5 and 17- essarily give rise to civil liability. Ellis v. Hale, 
27-21 was to impose a duty running to the 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 R2d 382 (1962). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 23. 
17-27-811. Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any county recorder who files or records a plat of a subdivision 
without the approvals required by this part is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
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EXHIBIT B 
17-27-1001 COUNTIES 
PART 10 
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this 
chapter until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decisio'n is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1001, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
L. 1991, ch. 235, § 106. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS adjustment; plaintiff could not initiate manda-
mus proceedings under § 17-27-1002 against 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 t h e commission for its alleged violation of the 
Violation of zoning resolution. ordinance. Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 267 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. U t a h A d v ' **>• 2 6 ( U t a h C t A*>P' 1 9 9 5 ) ' 
Plaintiff seeking to enjoin construction of a Violation of zoning resolution. 
trailer park was required to exhaust his admin- Landowners under former § 17-27-23 had a 
istrative remedies before an action for injunc- separate cause of action in the courts when a 
tive relief could be maintained. Lund v. Cotton- violation of a zoning resolution was charged; 
wood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305,392 P.2d 40 but where the alleged violation of the ordinance 
(1964). arose from the administration of the zoning 
A party must exhaust administrative rem- ordinance by an administrative agency, appeal 
edies before seeking judicial review of the de- from the administrative ruling should have 
nial of a building permit. Hatch v. Utah County been taken to the proper administrative tribu-
Planning Dep't, 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984). nal, or a suit should have been commenced in 
Plaintiff aggrieved by a decision of the county the courts within ninety days. Lund v. Cotton-
commission applying the zoning ordinance was wood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305,392 P.2d 40 
required to appeal that decision to the board of (1964) (decided under former § 17-27-15). 
17-27-1002. Enforcement. 
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the 
county in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the 
authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to 
other remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(b) A county need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction. 
434 
EXHIBIT C 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 22 
tion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196; Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. 
299 P.2d 827 (1956). Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 (1956)-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238. Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
*
 r a cr\ n T o \K ±- j r \ j s i as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1 , - „ j m ^ i . ;„AJ~L^ ,*„ +i^ J ^ ; ; ^ „,. A( 
et s ^ 71 C.J.S. Pleading
 § § 63 to 210,140 et ^SST^TASJSS fif* ° 
seq., 211 et seq.
 K e y N u m b e r s # __ Motions •=• 1 et seq.; 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment Pleading *=» 38 V2 to 186, 187 et seq. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossfclaim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of .the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
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or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15. 
Arbitration, § 78-31a-l et seq. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84. 
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, 
U.R.C.P. 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22. 
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-
9-203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished, U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affirmative defenses. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Time limitation. 
—Avoidance. 
—Consent. 
—Election of remedies. 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial. 
Notice and opportunity. 
Waiver of defense^ 
—Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. 
—Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead; 
Pleading. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Pleading. 
—Statute of limitations. 
Applicability to plaintiffs. 
Pleading. 
Waiver. 
—Waiver. 
Claims for relief. 
—Amendment of pleading. 
—Attorney fees. 
—Essential allegations. 
Alienation of affections. 
—Request for alternative relief. 
—Sufficiency of complaint. 
Attachment of exhibit. 
Found not sufficient. 
Found sufficient. 
Liberal construction. 
Consistency. 
—Double recovery. 
—Election between claims. 
—Election of remedies under contract. 
—Res judicata. 
—Separate claims. 
Contract and quantum meruit. 
Defenses. 
—Lack of consideration. 
Effect of failure to deny. 
Purpose of rules. 
Cited. 
Affirmative defenses. 
.—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative de-
fense which must be pleaded in the answer in 
order to be raised; in action to recover wages 
and commissions allegedly due to plaintiff, 
where defendant did not raise the defense in 
his answer, he could not subsequently rely on 
it. Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 
202 (1968). 
Assertion of accord and satisfaction is gener-
ally raised by way of affirmative defense to an 
action on the original agreement, and when so 
raised, it must be properly pleaded. Sugar-
house Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 
(Utah 1980). 
Time limitation. 
In action to rescind loan secured by mort-
gage, where defendant mortgagee failed to an-
swer amended complaint within ten days after 
service thereof under Rule 15, but filed motion 
for permission to set forth accord and satisfac-
tion one week before trial, refusal was not 
abuse of court's discretion. Wasescha v. Terra, 
Inc., 528 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974). 
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Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed- Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac- signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed- Procedural requirements for imposition of 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to sanctionsunder Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac- Pr0cedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
tions for infliction of emotional distress, 98
 K Numbers. — Pleading «=» 287 to 304. 
A.L.R. Fed. 442. J 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensablQ party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which.the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
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(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule arid does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.C.P. 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
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action, to prove permanence of injuries and to or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
AL.R.3d 170. Construction of statutes or rules making 
'propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro- mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land- P™ved J^T instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
 A Necessity and propnety of instructing on al-
AT R3d 1081 ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
ti' J--X _• • 4_ x- • -i warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
Verdict-urgmg instructions m civil case . . _ , . • . J _* r u-r* co 
B e
 m tort rnven 121 products liability case, 52 
stressing desirability and importance of agree- A L R 3d 101 
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
Verdict-urging instructions m civil case tion and effect ofprovision in Rule 51, and sim-
commenting on weight of majority view or au- Haj. state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. nity to make objections to instructions out of 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad- hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing. to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Child custody. 
A —Credibility of witnesses. 
Adoption. —Denial of motion. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Divorce decree modifications. 
—Advisory verdict. —Easement. 
—Breach of contract. —Evidentiary disputes. 
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EXHIBIT E 
913 P.2d 723, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, (Utah 1995) Pagel 
*723 913P.2d723 
Eva C. JOHNSON, C. Eugene Croxford, Burton J. 
Arrington, 
Cammon I. Arrington, Jeffrey B. Arrington, Irby 
N. 
Arrington, B-J Dry Cleaning and Shirt 
Laundering, 4-A 
Alliance, Arthur Milne, Thomas Lloyd, Union Park 
Center 
Associates, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
The REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, Jerold H. 
Barnes, the Salt Lake County Commission, and the 
Salt Lake County Commissioners, 
individually, Defendants and Appellees, 
Hermes & Associates, Intervenor. 
No. 940165. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 2, 1995. 
Rehearing Denied March 26, 1996. 
Residential property owner brought action against 
county redevelopment agency and county 
commission, challenging legality and regularity of 
county ordinance adopting redevelopment plan. 
Owner and agency moved for summary judgment. 
The District Court, Salt Lake County, Michael R. 
Murphy, J., granted agency's motions and denied 
owner's motion, ruling that agency had sufficiently 
complied with procedures set out in Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act to make ordinance 
valid. Owner appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) amended provision 
of Act, requiring that finding that redevelopment 
project area is blighted area be made by agency at 
time preliminary plan for project is prepared and by 
legislative body prior to adopting plan, applied 
retroactively to redevelopment project for which 
preliminary plan was prepared before effective date of 
statutory amendment; (2) agency did not comply with 
Act provision and, thus, resulting ordinance adopting 
redevelopment plan was invalid, despite contention 
that agency complied with provision by having 
generic belief that area was blighted when it decided 
to prepare preliminary plan; and (3) commission's 
preliminary vote, concluding that owner's property 
was blighted, was not formal "finding of blight" so as 
to trigger right under Act to de novo review of finding 
of blight and, thus, owner was not entitled to de novo 
review of preliminary vote. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^267 
268 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
Grant Aid Therefor 
268k267 Nature and purposes of improvements 
in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Purpose of Utah Neighborhood Development Act is 
to cure problem of blight through economic 
redevelopment. U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1201 et seq. 
2. APPEAL AND ERROR <@^842(1) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) In general. 
Utah 1995. 
On appeal, Supreme Court would grant no particular 
deference to district court's statutory interpretations 
but would review them for correctness. 
3. APPEAL AND ERROR <S^841 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k841 Review where facts are not disputed. 
Utah 1995. 
When no facts are in dispute, challenge to summary 
judgment presents only conclusions of law. 
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^267 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
Grant Aid Therefor 
268k267 Nature and purposes of improvements 
in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Proper construction of Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act is question of law. U.C.A.1953, 
17A-2-1201 et seq. 
5. STATUTES®^ 181(1) 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 Ik 180 Intention of Legislature 
361kl81 In General 
No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
913 P.2d 723, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, (Utah 1995) Page 2 
361kl81(l) In general. 
Utah 1995. 
Primary rule guiding Supreme Court in statutory 
interpretation is that Court gives effect to intent of 
legislature. 
6. STATUTES <®^ 188 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36lkl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 In general. 
Utah 1995. 
To discover intent of legislature, Supreme Court 
looks first to plain language of statute. 
7. STATUTES®^ 189 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36lkl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl89 Literal and grammatical 
interpretation. 
[See headnote text below] 
7. STATUTES <@^>212.6 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
361k212.6 Words used. 
Utah 1995. 
In construing statute, Supreme Court assumes that 
each term in statute was used advisedly; thus, 
statutory words are read literally unless such reading 
is unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
8. STATUTES®^ 184 
361 ----
361VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 lkl 80 Intention of Legislature 
361kl84 Policy and purpose of act. 
[See headnote text below] 
8. STATUTES <@^>217.4 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k217.4 Legislative history in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Only when Supreme Court finds ambiguity in 
statute's plain language does Court need to seek 
guidance from legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations. 
9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <© >^266 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
Grant Aid Therefor 
268k266 Constitutional and statutory 
provisions. 
Utah 1995. 
Amended provision of Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act, requiring that finding that 
redevelopment project area is blighted area be made 
by agency at time preliminary plan for project is 
prepared and by legislative body prior to adopting 
plan, applied retroactively to redevelopment project 
for which preliminary plan was prepared before 
effective date of statutory amendment; fact that 
nonretroactivity language was attached only to certain 
of amended Act provisions and not to others was clear 
indication that legislature intended to exempt ongoing 
redevelopment projects only from those specific 
sections containing nonretroactivity clauses, not from 
provisions of amended Act as a whole. U.C.A. 1953, 
17A-2-1208(l). 
10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <£=>299 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(B) Preliminary Proceedings and 
Ordinances or Resolutions 
268k299 Determination as to necessity and 
utility of improvement. 
Utah 1995. 
County redevelopment agency did not comply with 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act provision 
requiring that finding, that redevelopment project area 
is blighted area, be made by agency at time 
preliminary plan for project is prepared and, thus, 
resulting ordinance adopting redevelopment plan was 
invalid, despite contention that agency complied with 
provision by having generic belief that area was 
blighted when it decided to prepare preliminary plan; 
generic belief was inconsistent with common meaning 
of term "finding," such construction of term "finding" 
was inconsistent with purpose and intent of legislature 
in enacting Act, and such construction was 
unworkable when applied to term "finding" in other 
provisions in same Act section. U.C.A. 1953, 
17A-2-1208(l). 
11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ®^>282(1) 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
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Grant Aid Therefor 
268k282 Basis or Plan of Improvements 
268k282(l) In general. 
Utah 1995. 
*723 Because area redevelopment is serious action 
that may be in derogation of individual property 
rights, strict compliance with enabling legislation is 
required to enact ordinance setting up redevelopment 
plan. U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(1). 
12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <® >^267 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
Grant Aid Therefor 
268k267 Nature and purposes of improvements 
in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act is broad in 
scope and must be interpreted to delegate to agencies 
ample power to serve purposes of Act. U.C.A. 1953, 
17A-2-1201 et seq. 
13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S==>267 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(A) Power to Make Improvements or 
Grant Aid Therefor 
268k267 Nature and purposes of improvements 
in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act, which must 
be interpreted to delegate to agencies ample power to 
serve purposes of Act, must be strictly followed. 
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1201 et seq. 
14. STATUTES <®^>223.2(.5) 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k223 Construction with Reference to Other 
Statutes 
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to the Same 
Subject Matter in General 
361k223.2(.5) In general. 
Utah 1995. 
Supreme Court does not construe particular section 
of state statutory code in the abstract but, rather, in 
manner that is harmonious with other closely related 
code provisions. 
15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S=*299 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(B) Preliminary Proceedings and 
Ordinances or Resolutions 
268k299 Determination as to necessity and 
utility of improvement. 
Utah 1995. 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act provision 
requiring that finding, that redevelopment project area 
is blighted area, be made by agency at time 
preliminary plan for project is prepared contemplates 
formal, written finding that area is blighted before 
preliminary plan is prepared for that area. 
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(l). 
16. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <@^321(2) 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(B) Preliminary Proceedings and 
Ordinances or Resolutions 
268k321 Review of Proceedings 
268k321(l) Right to Review in General 
268k321(2) As to necessity or utility. 
Utah 1995. 
Preliminary vote of county commission, concluding 
that owner's residential property was blighted, was 
not formal "finding of blight" so as to trigger right 
under Utah Neighborhood Development Act to de 
novo review of finding of blight and, thus, owner was 
not entitled to de novo review of preliminary vote. 
U.C.A.1953, 17A-2-1208(3). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <®=*299 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(B) Preliminary Proceedings and 
Ordinances or Resolutions 
268k299 Determination as to necessity and 
utility of improvement. 
[See headnote text below] 
17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <@ >^321(2) 
268 — 
268IX Public Improvements 
268IX(B) Preliminary Proceedings and 
Ordinances or Resolutions 
268k321 Review of Proceedings 
268k321(l) Right to Review in General 
268k321(2) As to necessity or utility. 
Utah 1995. 
For purposes of Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act provisions, requiring that finding that 
redevelopment project area is blighted area be made 
by agency at time preliminary plan for project is 
prepared and by legislative body prior to adopting 
plan, and governing property owner's right to de novo 
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review of finding of blight by agency or governing 
body, "finding of blight" means formal, written 
finding that area is blighted. U.C.A.1953, 
17A-2-1208(l, 3). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
*724 Third District, Salt Lake County; The 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy. 
*725 Nolan J. Olsen, Martin N. Olsen, Midvale, 
and Walter F. Bugden, Salt Lake City, for Johnson, 
Harold A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for Barnes and the 
Redevelopment Agency. 
Paul G. Maughan, Douglas R. Short, Salt Lake 
City, for the County Commission. 
Nick J. Colessides, Salt Lake City, for Hermes. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Eva C. Johnson appeals from a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, the 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County ("the 
RDA") (FN1) and the Salt Lake County Commission 
("the Commission"). Johnson and others brought 
suit under the 1993 version of the Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act, (FN2) challenging the legality and 
regularity of a Salt Lake County ordinance adopting 
the Union Fort Redevelopment Plan. After each side 
moved for summary judgment, the district court 
granted defendants' motions and denied Johnson's, 
ruling that the RDA had sufficiently complied with the 
procedures set out in the 1993 Act to make the 
ordinance valid. (FN3) We reverse and remand to 
the district court to enter judgment in favor of 
Johnson in accordance with this opinion. 
[1] By way of background, the purpose of Utah's 
Neighborhood Development Act is to cure the 
problem of "blight" through economic redevelopment 
of the blighted area. Redevelopment Agency v. 
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1987) 
("Acquisition and redevelopment of 'blighted' 
property contributes to the health of the 
community."). The first step in the redevelopment 
process is the designation of a redevelopment survey 
area. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1204. After 
boundaries are set for the survey area, the properties 
within the area are studied to determine if economic 
redevelopment is feasible. Id. If redevelopment is 
feasible, the RDA may formulate a preliminary plan 
for the redevelopment of all or part of the survey 
area. Id. § 17A-2-1206. Once the RDA approves a 
preliminary plan, it is submitted to the legislative 
body (i.e., city council or county commission) for 
ultimate approval. Id. §§ 17A-2-1215, -1225, -1227. 
"Upon adoption by the legislative body the agency 
shall carry out the redevelopment project set forth in 
the plan." Id. § 17A-2-1215. The RDA is 
empowered to use increased tax revenues generated 
by the redevelopment to fund the project. Id. § 
17A-2-1247. "[BJecause redevelopment is a serious 
action that may be in derogation of individual 
property rights," Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act contains 
numerous safeguards to protect property owners. 
For instance, eminent domain may not be used by the 
RDA if the purpose of the plan is economic 
development unless the area to be developed is first 
found to be blighted. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
17A-2-1208, -1209. 
With this background in mind, we move on to the 
instant case. The dispositive facts are undisputed. 
At the heart of this case are a 22.5-acre tract of land 
and a 4.3-acre tract of land, both located in an 
unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County. At the 
beginning of the events in question, a portion of the 
22.5-acre tract was owned by Hermes & Associates, 
Ltd., an intervenor in this case. By the time this 
appeal was argued, however, Hermes owned all of 
the property in both parcels except for Johnson's. 
*726 In 1991, Hermes operated a shopping center 
known as the Family Center at Fort Union on 
property adjacent to the two tracts of land in question. 
As a shopping center developer, Hermes wanted to 
expand its Family Center operations onto the 
22.5-acre tract. In furtherance of this desire, on 
October 14, 1991, Hermes requested that the RDA 
designate the 22.5-acre tract as a redevelopment 
survey area. See id. § 17A-2-1207 (1991). The 
RDA complied with Hermes' request and passed a 
resolution designating the 22.5-acre parcel as the 
"Union Family Center Redevelopment Survey Area." 
This survey area was to be studied to determine if 
redevelopment was feasible. The Commission then 
met and facilitated the study by changing the county's 
master plan to accommodate the use Hermes proposed 
for the survey area. 
In June of 1992, after deciding that even more land 
was needed for the proposed expansion of its 
shopping center, Hermes requested that an additional 
4.3 acres be added to the survey area. The request 
was granted by the RDA in September, and the 
Commission again changed the master plan to 
accommodate the proposed expansion. Plaintiff 
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Johnson's property, a residence, was included in the 
additional 4.3 acres. 
On November 18, 1991, while only the original 
22.5-acre tract was proposed for redevelopment, the 
RDA hired independent consultants to study the 
survey area to determine whether "blight" existed and 
to assess the proposed redevelopment's impact on the 
area's traffic and economy. The consultants 
completed and published the blight survey in 
November of 1992. The final completed survey 
concluded that the whole survey area, including the 
additional 4.3 acres upon a portion of which 
Johnson's residence stands, was blighted and in need 
of redevelopment. The RDA then prepared a 
preliminary redevelopment plan, dated November 16, 
1992, and published notice of a public hearing to be 
held on the consultants' blight survey and the 
preliminary redevelopment plan. Johnson and others 
filed their first complaint, seeking to delay the 
evidentiary hearing regarding blight. 
The hearing eventually commenced on February 9th 
and was continued over a number of nonconsecutive 
days. It was held jointly before the Commission and 
the RDA. Redevelopment experts, real estate 
appraisers, and others presented evidence on the 
area's blight. On March 8, 1993, the members of 
the RDA voted unanimously to designate the entire 
survey area, including Johnson's property, as 
blighted. The RDA then referred the matter to the 
office of the county attorney to prepare written 
findings of fact regarding blight. 
Although the RDA had already made its preliminary 
determination that the survey area was blighted, the 
hearing continued on March 16, 1993, to consider 
other matters related to the redevelopment project. 
At this meeting, Johnson testified that she would 
"hold out" and not sell her property to Hermes. On 
March 24th, Johnson and others filed an amended 
complaint in the district court under section 
17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act, seeking de novo 
review by the district court of the March 8, 1993, 
blight determination. (FN4) At the time the 
complaint was filed, each of the plaintiffs owned 
property within the survey area. However, during 
the course of the instant legal action, all but Johnson 
eventually sold their properties to Hermes. 
On April 19th, the RDA directed the county 
attorney to exclude the Johnson property from the 
redevelopment area. As a result of this action, 
Johnson's property, which was the only parcel 
excluded from the proposed redevelopment area, was 
left surrounded on three sides by the project. This 
exclusion was effected without any further public 
hearings. At this same April 19th meeting, the RDA 
and the Commission included provisions in the plan 
for the use of eminent domain against any landowners 
unwilling to sell to Hermes and confirmed the plan's 
authorization *727 of the use of sales taxes from the 
project area to pay for the redevelopment project. 
On May 5, 1993, while Johnson's action was 
pending in the district court, the RDA and the 
Commission adopted written, formal findings of fact 
regarding blight and prepared an ordinance to create 
the Union Fort Neighborhood Redevelopment Project 
Area, which excluded the Johnson property. On 
May 24, 1993, after further revisions, the 
Commission drafted the final ordinance, which was 
passed at the close of the meeting. 
On June 23rd, Johnson filed an amended ten-count 
complaint challenging, under the 1993 Act, the 
regularity and legality of the redevelopment process 
and of the resulting plan and ordinance. Specifically, 
Johnson sought to invalidate the ordinance passed on 
May 24, 1993. Both Johnson and the RDA sought 
summary judgment. On January 12, 1994, the 
district court granted the RDA's motions and denied 
Johnson's. On the merits, the district court ruled 
that RDA had substantially complied with all of the 
applicable provisions of the 1993 Act. The district 
court also dismissed Johnson's demand for de novo 
review of the March 8th blight finding by holding that 
Johnson lacked standing to invoke section 
17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act because she was 
not an owner of property within the redevelopment 
area. Johnson appeals. 
[2] [3] [4] We first state the applicable standard of 
review. "When no facts are in dispute, a challenge to 
a summary judgment presents only conclusions of 
law." Texaco, Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 
942, 943 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, the proper 
construction of the Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act is a question of law. See State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, we grant 
no particular deference to the district court's statutory 
interpretations but review them for correctness. 
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994); accord Ward 
v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
[5] [6] [7] [8] The primary rule guiding us in statutory 
interpretation is that we give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 
853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). To discover that 
intent, we look first to the plain language of the 
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statute. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357; Schurtz v. BMW 
ofN. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989); see also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) ("Unambiguous 
language in [a] statute may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning."). In construing a 
statute, we assume that "each term in the statute was 
used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
"Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain 
language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations." World 
Peace, 879 P.2d at 259; see also Schurtz, 814 P.2d 
at 1112 ("We first look to the statute's plain language. 
Only if we find some ambiguity need we look 
further."); Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 686 ("Where 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent."). 
Johnson asks this court to invalidate the ordinance 
adopting the Fort Union Redevelopment Project on 
the ground that the RDA and the Commission failed 
to strictly comply with the procedural steps set out in 
the 1993 Act. (FN5) Specifically, Johnson claims 
that the RDA failed (i) to designate a project area at 
the time and in the manner outlined in section *728 
17A-2-1206 of the 1993 Act; (ii) to prepare a 
preliminary plan at the time and in the manner 
outlined in section 17A-2-1208(l) of the 1993 Act; 
and (iii) to provide area residents and property owners 
with written notice and the opportunity to review and 
comment on the preliminary plan as required by 
sections 17A-2-1222 through -1225 of the 1993 Act. 
Because we find Johnson's second claim dispositive, 
we limit our discussion to that issue: to wit, whether 
the RDA failed to prepare a preliminary plan in 
accordance with the provisions of section -1208(1) of 
the 1993 Act. That section provides as follows: 
If the redevelopment plan will authorize the use of 
eminent domain, the redevelopment project area 
described in the redevelopment plan must be a 
blighted area and a finding that the area is a 
blighted area must be made by the agency at the 
time a preliminary plan is prepared, and must be 
made by the legislative body prior to adopting the 
plan under Section 17A-2-1225. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1208(1) (emphasis 
added). 
Before the district court, Johnson argued that the 
RDA failed to comply with section -1208(1) because 
it made a finding that the area to be included in the 
preliminary plan was blighted only after the 
preliminary plan was prepared, rather than "at the 
time a preliminary plan is prepared," as the 1993 Act 
requires. The Commission and RDA's argument in 
response is two-fold: (i) that section -1208(1) did not 
apply because the preliminary plan was prepared 
before that section of the 1993 Act was passed; and 
(ii) that even if section -1208(1) applies, they had 
"unwittingly complied" with its requirements by 
making a "generic" finding of blight at the time they 
prepared the preliminary plan and by referencing the 
blight survey in the preliminary plan. The district 
court agreed with the RDA and the Commission and 
ruled that "it appears that a sufficient finding of blight 
was in fact made in the Union Fort Preliminary 
Plan." 
[9] On appeal, the parties simply restate the 
positions they took before the district court. We 
begin our analysis with the applicability of section 
-1208(1) of the 1993 Act to the Fort Union 
Redevelopment Project. 
When the legislature substantially rewrote the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act in 1993, it included a 
nonretroactivity clause in some, but not all, of the 
individual amended sections of the Act. (FN6) 
Johnson contends that if the legislature had intended 
to exclude all projects then in process from 
compliance with the 1993 Act, the legislature would 
have placed the nonretroactivity language in one 
section at the beginning of the Act and given it a 
blanket application or, alternatively, it would have 
included the language in each and every amended 
section. Instead, it chose to include a specific 
nonretroactivity clause in many, but not all, of the 
changed sections. This indicates an intention to 
make only selected provisions have prospective effect. 
Because the 1993 Act lacks a blanket nonretroactivity 
clause and no such clause is attached to section 
-1208(1), the plain language shows a legislative 
intention to apply the new provision to all then-
pending redevelopment plans. The Commission and 
the RDA concede that the nonretroactivity language 
does not appear in every new or amended section of 
the 1993 Act, but they contend, "It is obvious that the 
1993 amendments, read as a whole, indicate that the 
legislature intended H.B. 278 [the 1993 amendments] 
to apply prospectively and address redevelopment 
plans commenced after April 1, 1993." 
*729 We agree with Johnson. The fact that the 
nonretroactivity language was attached only to certain 
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of the amended provisions and not to others is a clear 
indication that the legislature intended to exempt 
ongoing redevelopment projects only from those 
specific sections containing nonretroactivity clauses, 
not from the provisions of the 1993 Act as a whole. 
Under the construction placed on the 1993 Act by the 
Commission and the RDA, in essence, we would 
have to read each of the thirty-four nonretroactivity 
provisions out of the Act and, at the same time, read 
a blanket nonretroactivity provision back into the Act. 
This would conflict with the basic tenet of statutory 
construction that we assume "each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." Savage, 811 P.2d at 670. 
[10][11][12][13] Having concluded that section 
-1208(1) of the 1993 Act applied to the Fort Union 
Redevelopment Project, we must next address the 
second issue: whether the RDA and the Commission 
complied with section -1208(l)'s requirement that 
"[i]f the redevelopment plan will authorize the use of 
eminent domain, the redevelopment project area 
described in the redevelopment plan must be a 
blighted area and a finding that the area is a blighted 
area must be made by the agency at the time a 
preliminary plan is prepared." Utah Code Ann. § 
17A-2-1208(1) (emphasis added). We proceed with 
the understanding that "because redevelopment is a 
serious action that may be in derogation of individual 
property rights, ... strict compliance with the enabling 
legislation is required to enact an ordinance setting up 
a redevelopment plan." Murray City Redevelopment, 
598 P. 2d at 1344. Although the Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act "is broad in scope and must be 
interpreted to delegate to the agencies ample power to 
serve the purposes of the Act, i.e., to alleviate blight, 
it is necessary that the legislation enabling this grant 
of authority be strictly followed." Id. 
As noted above, section -1208(1) embodies the 
concern about the need for careful compliance with 
statutory prerequisites because of the potential impact 
of redevelopment on individual property owners. It 
mandates, "If the redevelopment plan will authorize 
the use of eminent domain, the redevelopment project 
area described in the redevelopment plan must be a 
blighted area and a finding that the area is a blighted 
area must be made by the agency at the time a 
preliminary plan is prepared." Utah Code Ann. § 
17A-2-1208(1) (emphasis added). Johnson argues 
that the RDA failed to comply with this provision 
because it prepared the preliminary redevelopment 
plan in November of 1992 but did not formally "find" 
that the area comprising the redevelopment was 
blighted until March 8, 1993. 
The RDA and the Commission, on the other hand, 
argue that the RDA "unwittingly" complied with 
section -1208(1) when it prepared the preliminary 
plan. According to the RDA and the Commission, 
section -1208(1) does not require that the "finding" of 
blight "be by resolution, that it be reduced to writing, 
or meet any other formal requirement." A "finding" 
of blight, as that term is used in section -1208(1), 
means nothing more than a "generic" belief by the 
RDA that the area is blighted and that it has decided 
to prepare a preliminary plan designed to cure that 
supposed blight. The RDA notes that it was aware, 
as early as February 26, 1992, that the consultant 
conducting the blight survey had preliminarily 
determined that the area was blighted. It was on the 
basis of the consultant's final report, a report that was 
ultimately referenced in the preliminary plan, that the 
RDA directed that a preliminary plan be prepared. 
These actions, contends the RDA, are sufficient to 
meet the "generic" finding-of-blight requirement 
contained in section -1208(1). 
We conclude that section -1208(1) contemplates 
much more than the "generic" finding of blight 
contended for by the RDA and the Commission. We 
reach this result because (i) the term "finding" is 
commonly understood to mean a formal, written 
determination of fact; (ii) the RDA and the 
Commission's construction of the term "finding" is 
inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the 
legislature in enacting the Utah Neighborhood 
Redevelopment Act; and (iii) the construction 
advocated by the Commission and the RDA is 
unworkable when applied to *730 the identical term 
as it is used in other subparts of section -1208. 
Although the terms "finding" and "finding of blight" 
are not defined in the 1993 Act, the term "finding" is 
commonly understood to connote a formal, written 
determination of a disputed issue by an adjudicative 
body. See Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'I Cos., 842 P. 2d 
865, 867 (Utah 1992) (noting that in interpreting 
meaning of a given word or phrase, "we give effect to 
each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning"). For instance, Webster's New 
International Dictionary defines the term "finding" as 
follows: "The result of a judicial examination or 
inquiry, esp. into some matter of fact, as embodied in 
a jury's verdict or a court's decision or a referee's 
report." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 949 (2d ed. 
1954). Furthermore, American Jurisprudence states, 
"Findings are a formal, deliberate statement of a 
court's determination of facts.... Findings of fact 
may be defined as the written statement of the 
ultimate facts as found by the court, signed by the 
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court, and filed therein, and essential to support the 
decision and judgment rendered therein." 75B 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1968 (1992). The RDA's 
assertion that a "finding" of blight is nothing more 
than a general consensus or an informal understanding 
among the commissioners that blight exists stands in 
stark contrast to the general usage of the term. 
More important, the construction the Commission 
and the RDA place on section -1208(1) is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the 1993 Act. See Sullivan, 853 
P. 2d at 880 (noting that primary rule of statutory 
construction is to give effect to intent of legislature in 
light of purpose statute was meant to achieve). The 
purpose behind redevelopment legislation is the 
alleviation of blight. See Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P. 2d at 1342. For a 
redevelopment agency to address the issue of curing 
blight-which cure may involve a "taking" of private 
property for public use-the agency must ascertain 
with specificity whether and to what extent blight 
exists in a survey area. It is for this reason that the 
legislature requires a redevelopment agency to make a 
formal "finding" that blight exists before it develops a 
plan to cure the blight. Utah Code Ann. § 
17A-2-1208(l). The "generic" finding-of-blight 
requirement that the Commission and the RDA 
advocate is insufficient to guarantee that the 
redevelopment process is driven by the desire to cure 
blight rather than by the desire for the economic 
development that is promised to follow from a finding 
of blight or, in other words, that the cart does not 
precede the horse that is supposed to be pulling it. 
[14] Finally, as we recently noted in Nixon v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995), we 
do not construe a particular section of the Code in the 
abstract but, rather, in a manner that is harmonious 
with other closely related code provisions. See also 
Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112-13. Section -1208(3)(b) 
of the 1993 Act provides, "Within 30 days after a 
finding of blight, ... an owner may appeal [that 
finding] to a court of competent jurisdiction." Utah 
Code Ann. § 17A-2-1208(3)(b). If we were to adopt 
the RDA's informal construction of the term "finding 
of blight" for section -1208(1), we would be required 
to adopt that same reading for section -1208(3). 
Under that reading, property owners would never 
know when to appeal an agency's finding of blight 
because there would be no requirement that the 
finding of blight, in the words of the Commission, 
"be by resolution, that it be reduced to writing, or 
meet any other formal requirement." (FN7) 
[15] Because we cannot give the term "finding of 
blight" in section -1208(1) the construction the RDA 
advocates without doing significant damage to the 
remaining subsections *731. of section -1208, see 
Curtis v. Harmon Elecs., Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(Utah 1978) (noting presumption that statutes are not 
intended to produce undesirable or inequitable 
consequences), and because the RDA's reading of the 
term is inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the 
legislature in adopting the 1993 Act, we conclude that 
section -1208(1) contemplates a formal, written 
finding that an area is blighted before a preliminary 
plan is prepared for that area. Since the RDA did 
not make a formal, written finding of blight prior to 
or at the time it prepared the preliminary plan and 
because "strict compliance with the enabling 
legislation is required to enact an ordinance setting up 
a redevelopment plan," Murray City Redevelopment, 
598 P.2d at 1344, we conclude that the ordinance in 
question is invalid. 
[16] In addition to asking us to invalidate the 
ordinance creating the Fort Union Redevelopment 
Plan, Johnson seeks a declaration that she was 
"wrongfully denied the opportunity for [de novo] trial 
review of the finding of blight," as provided by 
section -1208(3) of the 1993 Act. (FN8) Johnson 
seeks this declaration because she believes that section 
-1208(3)(b) "is one of the most important of the 1993 
amendments to the Act." Our resolution of this issue 
is governed by our analysis of section -1208(1) set out 
above. 
[17] We hold that Johnson was not entitled to de 
novo judicial review of the blight finding because the 
preliminary vote of the Commission on March 8, 
1993, which concluded that Johnson's property was 
blighted, was not a formal "finding of blight" as that 
term is used in section -1208(3) and, therefore, did 
not trigger the right to de novo judicial review. The 
term "finding of blight" both in section -1208(1) and 
in section -1208(3) means a formal, written finding 
that an area is blighted. See Nixon, 898 P. 2d at 269. 
The RDA and the Commission made a formal, 
written finding of blight on May 5, 1993, but the 
finding specifically excluded Johnson's property. 
Because neither the RDA nor the Commission ever 
"found" that Johnson's property was blighted within 
the meaning of the statute, the district court did not 
err in denying de novo judicial review under section 
-1208(3)(b). 
Because we conclude that the RDA failed to comply 
with the provisions of section -1208(1) and that the 
Commission's ordinance adopting the Fort Union 
Redevelopment Plan is invalid, we reverse and 
remand to the district court to enter judgment in favor 
of Johnson in accordance with this opinion. 
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STEWART, Associate C.J., and HOWE, 
DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., opinion. 
FNl. The RDA is a municipal/county agency 
composed of the members of the Salt Lake County 
Commission who sit as the RDA to exercise the 
powers conferred by statute on redevelopment 
agencies. 
FN2. The legislature promulgated the original version 
of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act in 
1969. Utah Neighborhood Development Act, ch. 
5, §§ 1-15, 1969 Utah Laws 1134. We will refer 
to this version of the statute as the " 1969 Act." In 
1993, the legislature substantially rewrote the Act. 
Redevelopment Amendments, ch. 50, §§ 1-48, 1993 
Utah Laws 325. We will refer to this version of 
the statute as the " 1993 Act." 
FN3. Before the district court, the parties vigorously 
contested the issue of which version of the Act 
applied to the Fort Union Redevelopment Plan. 
Because the district court ruled that the RDA and 
the Commission had complied with the more 
stringent requirements of the 1993 Act, it concluded 
that it did not need to address the issue of which 
version of the Act applied to Johnson's claims. 
FN4. Section 17A-2-1208(3)(b) of the 1993 Act states 
as follows: 
Within 30 days after a finding of blight under 
Section 17A-2-1206 or 17A-2-1225, an owner may 
appeal a finding of blight by an agency or governing 
body to a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
court shall review that finding of blight de novo, and 
the agency shall maintain the burden of proof 
regarding blight. 
FN5. We note that as a "person in interest," Johnson 
has standing to challenge the legality and regularity 
of the ordinance under section 17A-2-1226 of the 
Utah Code, which provides: 
The legislative body by ordinance may adopt the 
redevelopment plan in its original form or as 
modified as the official redevelopment plan for the 
project area. For a period of 60 days after 
publication of the ordinance adopting the 
redevelopment plan, any person in interest may 
contest the regularity, formality or legality of the 
ordinance. After the 60 day period no person may 
contest the regularity, formality or legality of the 
ordinance for any cause whatsoever. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1226. 
FN6. The nonretroactivity clause, depending upon the 
context of the relevant statutory provision, reads as 
follows: 
[This section applies to] projects for which a 
preliminary plan has been prepared after April 1, 
1993, and for which any of the following have 
occurred after July 1, 1993: The completion of the 
agency blight study, and the good faith 
commencement of the hearing by the agency under 
Section 17A-2-1221.... 
[or] 
[This section does not apply to] projects for which a 
preliminary plan has been prepared prior to April 1, 
1993, and for which all of the following have 
occurred prior to July 1, 1993: The agency blight 
study has been completed, and a hearing under 
Section 17A-2-1221 has in good faith been 
commenced by the agency.... 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1207. 
*731_ FN7. The Commission seems to recognize this 
fact in its brief. In its discussion of section 
-1208(3), the Commission urges this court to hold 
that "Johnson's action challenging the finding of 
blight was premature, because it was filed prior to 
the entry of the [RDA's] and the Commission's 
[written] Findings of Fact regarding blight." The 
Commission moves on to argue that its oral finding 
of blight made on March 8, 1993, was not, in fact, 
a formal finding of blight, but was more akin to an 
unsigned minute entry. As such, the Commission 
argues, the oral finding of blight was not sufficient 
to trigger the right to de novo judicial review set out 
in section -1208(3). Curiously, the Commission 
makes this argument, while at the same time 
arguing that the finding of blight required by section 
-1208(1) need only be generic and informal. 
FN8. For the text of section -1208(3)(b), see supra 
note 4. 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MARCH 29, 1995; A. M. SESSION 
2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Olsen. 
3 Both sides have done an excellent job in 
4 presenting to me their twist of the matter. My analysis 
5 has been over a couple of days, because I have had 
6 opportunity to prepare for this hearing and it's sort of 
7 like a tennis match: I read one side, I'm on that side. 
8 I read the other side, I'm on that side. But I have to 
9 look at this in a practical light, that if I denied the 
10 motion to dismiss at this time and we proceed further, and 
11 in fact I'm incorrect as to the caution of the remedies 
12 that Mr. Colessides says, then if the matter proceeds and 
13 there is an adverse judgment on behalf of the 
14 plaintiffs — on behalf of defendants, then he's going to 
15 prevail on appeal in this matter. 
16 On the other hand, if I were crystal clear and 
17 certain that those positions taken by plaintiffs in this 
18 matter would overcome any appeal process, I would feel 
19 much more comfortable in ruling against the motion for 
20 summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. 
21 I have to look at it in the light of the 
22 practical aspects of this matter. I think that since both 
23 sides have supplemented, somewhat, their memorandum by 
24 oral argument, and especially Mr. Colessides, and now 
25 referring to the county ordinance, that is why I took the 
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1 approximately 45, 50-minute break to allow both sides to, 
2 number one, educate the court as well as educate 
3 themselves as to the procedures involved here. 
4 While I do recognize, Mr. Olsen, that this is not 
5 an appeal, but it appears to me, though the general scheme 
6 of administrative remedies, regardless if you call it an 
7 appeal or not an appeal, is to allow the County to tend to 
8 their own business. To allow the County to have first 
9 opportunity to rectify any wrings that there may be, and 
10 to follow through before litigation is contemplated in 
11 district court. 
12 On the other hand, I do recognize the case of 
13 Mason v. State as controlling on the facts as indicated. 
14 But it was my distinct recollection as to previous hearing 
15 which have been referred to in both memorandum — if not 
16 in yours, Mr. Olsen, that the court ruled adverse to a 
17 temporary restraining order on the sole issue — I think 
18 it was in your memorandum — on the sole issue that I did 
19 not find irreparable harm. 
20 The irreparable harm alleged at that time was the 
21 inability to have adequate ingress and egress into the 
22 property as owned by those property owners surrounded by 
23 the 7240 South, the North Union Avenue up until the time 
24 it was closed, and I cannot see the north south street 
25 designated. 
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1 MR. COLESSIDES: It's 10 ~ 
2 THE COURT: The one to the right of 1035 East, 
3 what's that street number? 
4 MR. COLESSIDES: This is this one here. It is 
5 the vacation ordinance easement. It does not have a name. 
6 THE COURT: Right. 
7 MR. COLESSIDES: It's that 25-foot easement. 
8 THE COURT: And so in that regard there has been 
9 no showing to my satisfaction in anything addition to what 
10 I previously ruled on. I further find that the provisions 
11 as to 17-27-1001, in addition to the county ordinance, has 
12 not been complied with. 
13 What I'm going to do, I'm going to dismiss this 
14 matter without prejudice — without prejudice, that is 
15 emphasized — allowing you to exhaust whatever means you 
16 wish to, your administrative remedies, and then have 
17 leave, if after that time there has been no resolution to 
18 your satisfaction, through the — through Mr. Jones, 
19 through the board of planning — the Planning Commission, 
20 through the Board of County Commissioners and the Board of 
21 Adjustment, then you do have leave, without prejudice, to 
22 refile the matter. 
23 I also take — and I would ask that you receive a 
24 copy of the transcript in this matter, Mr. Olsen, for 
25 those positions taken by Mr. Colessides, in that you are 
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1 not going to be prejudiced by any waiver of time. 
2 It is my indication from listening to you, 
3 Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that it is a 
4 continuing problem and that there will be no waiver of 
5 time, and your position taken before me today, and I 
6 expect that no contrary position be taken in further 
7 litigation — 
8 MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the 
9 exception of the vacation ordinance. 
10 THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is subject 
11 to a previous order that I made. 
12 MR. COLESSIDES: Right. As it relates, your 
13 Honor, to enforcement of 1186 and to the conditional use 
14 permit, I respectfully submit to the court that so long as 
15 there is a continuous development, that is a continuous 
16 enforcement problem, and therefore, there is not — in 
17 that sense there is no time limitations. 
18 THE COURT: The reason why I state that, 
19 Mr. Olsen, the court is relying somewhat upon 
20 Mr. Colessides's position in that matter in rendering the 
21 decision, which in my opinion would minimize whatever 
22 prejudice, if any, would be to the plaintiffs in this 
23 matter. 
24 All I'm asking you to start again, go through the 
25 procedures. If at that time you're at the same posture as 
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1 you are now, you will have leave to refile. It will 
2 not — it may or may not come to me. I don't know what 
3 the computer will spit out. But that would be my ruling 
4 as to the — this would be the judgment on the pleadings 
5 based upon the responses and the allegations, and it will 
6 be dismissed without prejudice to follow those procedures 
7 as I have indicated. 
8 Mr. Colessides, could you draft up the 
9 appropriate order. 
10 MR. COLESSIDES: Yes, your Honor. May I have 
11 leave of the court to wait until Nora prepares the 
12 transcript of these proceedings, your Honor, so that I can 
13 use those to have the order? 
14 THE COURT: And please submit it to Mr. Olsen 
15 prior to the court's submission so this matter can be 
16 moved on. 
17 MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
3 County of Salt Lake ) 
4 I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a 
5 Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter 
6 in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I 
7 reported the occasion of the proceedings of the 
8 above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place. 
9 That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype using 
10 computer-aided transcription real-time technology 
11 consisting of pages 3 through 7 inclusive. That the same 
12 constitutes a true and correct transcription of the bench 
13 ruling in said proceedings. 
14 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with 
15 any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am 
16 not interested in the events thereof. 
17 WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd 
18 day of April, 1995. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Nora S. Worthen, RPR 
24 Utah License No. 22-106373-7801 
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EXHIBIT G 
NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8;i J-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Attorney for defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE ill'' UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, 
J. BLAINE JOHNSON, . ORDER 
EVA C. JOHNSON, and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, and 
COMMISSIONER E. JAMES 
BRADLEY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT 
OVERSON, individually, 
Del'etuictnl w . 
Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or 
-- the alternative itiul : • >, summary judgment having come 
regularly for he=»r> • oursuant to 
Tonorab.- • - - -- Judge, 
presiding, j.ai-*. ;-t epresente.i - Martir "* se" 
their attorney of record, nn<J 
^%£^ 
ViUO DISTRICT TORT 
APR 1 4 1995 
,_^$6— 
i.asv II , I 03 91)1 
j u a g c . ,onn >• I w a s a k i 
. .. -_ , ornev -* :. r : v ^ . „. „ 
having ^view< f ' M 'ariout r - memoranda *nd 
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 : * .i * *u isti un . .ehdif 
of all , ties, ,un1 the matter havincj been submitted to the 
Court . | l N » | 4- | ( I * | ' " ! • • ' • " ( M i p r " i ( i m n i f i n n i i* i p p n - | i 
oiessides attorney for 
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m ained w . M D rj i r 1 1 : t s : second 
therefor, now upon motion of Nick 
defendants, 
I 
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i"ecu,ii ULi . . ,e. 
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FURTHEF ORDERED that 
a- asser; :J -.. . .:enaam. , t . 
complaint t i, n.ss^d w'thout prejudice; and 
FURTHF^5 ORDERED thai 
complains ^mo i u M , ,ssed without 
(v-orre^ted) , 
he 
amended 
prejudice . 
Dated t h i s • /9h 
I S / / IV" '< 
wc , 1995, 
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GLENN K. IWASi 
4,/^ r*' District Court Judge 
APPROVE™ 
MARTIN N. OLSEN 
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THIS BEING THE TIME HERETOFORE SCHEDULED for a public hearim- for 
Applicatioi i #PL-94-7001 - 'Hermes Associates in regard to a Btreet vacat - or. 
East North Union Avenue (7310 South), C-2 & R-2-10 zones/Union. 
Mr. Bill Marsh, Development Services Section Manager, stated that 
this is ai i item being considered for a street vacation. The application was 
submitted to the Planning Commission requesting a vacation of certain streets in 
the Union Fort area - the vacation of the streets would help accommodate the 
9 
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expansion of the Family Center. As they look at the aerial photograph, he 
pointed out several key points - the canal, boundary of existing Family Center, 
Union Park Avenue (1300 East), South Union Avenue, North Union Avenue where they 
access to 1300 East and 1000 East. The areas outlined in the red, yellow and 
green are the areas to be vacated and some of them have roads on them now, some 
of them would be partial vacations of existing right-of-ways, some are areas that 
don't have roads on them now, but should be included in the vacation. There are 
some areas in a public right-of-way that have structures located on them - 1000 
East (map) there is a home that appears to be located within the right-of-way. 
The Planning Commission reviewed this application on riarch 22, 1994, approving 
the request to vacate the Btreets and recommending the County Commission vacate 
those streets. 
Commissioner Overson reminded the Commission that this hearing was 
held once before (April 25, 1994) and the only thing that was flawed was the 
notice to the most impacted property owner, who is present today. 
Mr. Marsh indicated that they double checked the list and made sure 
that the property owner-of-record was notified and that the relative that had 
interest was also notified. 
Mr. Reese Jensen, Hermes Associates, stated that this is a redo of 
what occurred on the 25th of April and is being redone this evening to correct 
the technical flaw of insufficient notice. He has in his hand a copy of a 
document dated February 28, 1994, which was executed by Chairman Bradley on 
behalf of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County and he made a brief quote 
from Attachment #5 to this document, page 57 which is the agencies undertakings 
and further on page 70 "upon petition of the developer, the agency will seek to 
have the county commence the statutory vacation process of the public streets, 
roads and public right-of-ways no longer needed as part of the development on the 
site as shown and described in Attachment 9." He would simply observe that they 
are eager to move forward and has in his hand a copy of the document that has 
been prepared by Mr. Nick Colessides, Attorney for Hermes, granting a non-
exclusive easement to Eva C. Johnson to provide continuing access to the property 
and that has been discussed with Mr. Kent Lewis of the County Attorney's office 
and they have Mr. Richard Miller who has prepared tho technical work And hnn 
interacted with Brent Tidwell, Development Engineering Administrator. All of the 
proper documentation is in place and they are here to request that what happened 
on the 25th will repeated this evening in approval. 
Commissioner Bradley stated that for the record, he may have executed 
that document, but he voted against it. 
Mr. Nolan Olson, Olsen & Olsen, Attorney, stated that he sent the 
Commissioners a letter dated the 12th day of May, 1994, referring to some case 
law. There isn't any question in his mind that if they vacate this road, they 
probably have a right to do so, but if they vacate it, his client's property goes 
to tho middle of the road. Under the Mason vs. State case, if they vacate it 
they need to give his client to the middle of the road. His clients are Eva 
Johnson and Eleana Gulbertson, Mr. Croxford is dead, and they own the .91 of an 
acre on North Union Avenue. When the county vacates this property, they have a 
provision that walls them in on the north side or south side of North Union 
Avenue. How can they be walled in when the law says they get the property if 
vacated - it has to go to the abutting land owner. They can't be walled in on 
the north side of North Union Avenue/ if they are going to be walled in, they 
have to be walled in in the middle, of the road - that's the law. He has 
furnished this to the County Attorney's office. They have to give them 
reasonable access - the Mason case specifically provides that they not only have 
to give them reasonable access, egress and ingress, but they have to be on a 
public access. What they heard Mr. Jensen just say was that they were going to 
give them an easement across their property - the county is going to give this 
road to Hermes. The county can't give this road to Hermes, if they are going to 
do anything, it has to give this road to his clients to the middle of the road. 
They have to provide them access to a public road, not across Hermes property, 
but public access - that's the law. If they vacate this road tonight and they 
tell Hermes to go in and start digging that road up, his people have no way to 
get to their property. If the county does anything, he would expect this 
Commission to have at least enough courtesy to hold that off for a ten-day period 
until they can get a court hearing to determine if this Commission can vacate 
this road, can give that property to Hermes, or do they have to give it to his 
clients - that's the law. He doesn't think the county really cares at this 
point-on-time because the county has a contract with Hermes that says that Hermes 
is going to take all of the responsibility of lawsuits against this County 
Commission, but basically how does this Commission look in relation to this, they 
lose two to one on every vote, but how does this Commiscion look if in fact they 
vacate this road and say that Hermes gets it, what is Hermes paying for it. 
Nothing. There is some law that say they have to pay if they vacate, but it also 
specifically provides that the abutting landowner gets to the middle of the road 
and his clients description goes to the middle of the road - they can't vacate 
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that property and have Hermes put a wall up on the north side or south side of 
North Union Avenue and then say that they can come onto Hermes property to try 
and get out of their property, that isn't proper. He doesn't expect a favorable 
vote from this Commission, but he does expect this Commission to give them some 
time to get an injunction against this Commission to vacate this road, 
Commissioner Horiuchi asked Mr, Kent Lewis, Deputy County Attorney, 
if he would respond to this matter. It is his understanding that only part of 
this road will be vacated, but any portion there io rpiwhnrppmonf back to the 
county for that matter as he understands it. 
HI i: o J i en, J nd i c a t ecl t h a t t h e who • < • - •. i • - - ** ?. " * i e vac a t e d • 
Mr, Lewis stated that it is their recommendation that the portion in 
front of Croxfords not be vacated, but permanently closed, at least twenty-five 
feet, and then the easements be granted to both Hermes and the Croxfords, so it 
won't go as a matter of law to the abutting property owners - it will still 
remain in the public domain, but an easement be granted across it. Mr. Olsen is 
correct in stating that under the law when a public road is vacated they have to 
provide reasonable alternative access to the property and that is the issue this 
Commission has to decide as to whether that is reasonable alternative access. 
Obviously, they say it isn't and Hermes believes that it is, so that is what 
their d e c i s i o n i s 
Commissioner Bradley asked him to say that again. 
Mr. Lewis stated that when they close a public road arid it is one 
they have a right to use, they have a private easement across that still, unless 
reasonable alternative access is provided. The issue for them to decide is 
whether the alternati ve acceso still gives them reasonable acceso to their 
property. 
Commissioner Bradley asked what the be - • •« o m -*KI.*£ 
:: I: i t i I i til ne public domain, 
Mr. Lewis stated that if they vacate it, ao a matter of law, it goes 
equally to the abutting owners, even without any conveyances. If they vacate it, 
half of it would go to Hermes and half to the Croxfords - if they keep it in 
public ownership, the public interest and the public ownership, but close it, 
then they could convey easements so both of them could have access to their 
properties across that twenty-five feet and that is what the recommendation would 
be to avoid the problem of the title transferring automatically to both property 
owners. 
Co mm J i s ,1 o n e r B r a d 1 e y a s k e d w h o d e t e i: m i, n e s 11 i a t e a seme n t. 
M r. Le w J s s t a t e d t h a t t h e y d o t h i n In t h e i r d e c i s i o n (h e wa s n * t s u r e 
what Comm i o si o n er Brad1e y me ant) 
Commissioner Bradley hey vacate the road, wl »o 
determines - there is an access? 
Commissioner Overson indicated that they v< vacating the road. 
If they follow the recommendation, they won't have • problem alleged by Mr. 
OI oen There ia an, acceeo 
Mr. Lewis stated that they were vacating the road, except for this 
one piece if they do what is recommended to solve this problem. From his 
understanding, Hermes is going to grant access from a public road to their road 
and the issue for them to decide is if this is a reasonable alternative access. 
Commissioner Bradley asked Mr. Marsh is he could show them, on, the map 
- he wanted to know if they have seen the proposed access (yes). 
Mr. Marsh located the Croxford property and stated that as they look 
at the plat the public street looks like it is paved to here and looks like a 
dirt road up to that point from that small ditch going east that has been 
formally vacated. The proposal for the access would be that they would come up 
this public right-of-way (map) and Hermes would provide a right-of-way up the 
side of their property and across the front of the vacated road. There are two 
structures on the Croxford property - one is located there (map) and the other 
is there - those driveways currently come out to the north, so access would be 
up the public street, up the right-of-way, across the front of the property so 
they could access those two homes. 
Commissioner Bradley asked If there was a more appropriate right-of-
% - • oroposed. 
C o m m i s s i o n e r o v e r s o n do/veu by v/hoiTi. 
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Commissioner Bradley stated by anyone* 
Commissioner Overson stated that this is the one being proposed by 
their staff and attorney - there isn't any other alterative proposal before them, 
Mr. Nick Colessldes stated that he would like to address the issue 
of access. They will note that presently the Croxford or Johnson property has 
access on two fronts - the south and north part. The county is being asked to 
vacate the north portion of the street and also to leave in the public domain, 
part of that portion. By Hermes giving a twenty-five foot easement on the west 
side of the street, as Mr. Graham pointed out earlier, the property now has 
access on three places - north, south and west. The issue raised by Mr. Olsen 
of the money has been addressed - the issue of consideration has been raised in 
the RDA/Hermes agreement and they will note that the appropriate department, Real 
Estate through Roger Hillam, is ascertaining the cost of this particular vacation 
of road and will be dealt with in accordance with that agreement. By asking the 
Commission to do exactly what it is being asked to do, that is to vacate that 
portion of the road except twenty-five feet directly north of the Croxford 
property and by allowing Hermes to give them the access of twenty-five feet on 
the west side, they will have proper access to their property and at the same 
time, the issue of consideration will be resolved in accordance with the 
agreement. They are meeting all of the obligations, both the spirit and intent, 
of what is being asked to be done here. 
Mr. Robert Hale, a resident of the area, stated that the access that 
appears on the last drawing he saw was that this twenty-five easement was 
immediately adjacent to a loading dock, a loading entrance. There is no other 
docks space for the two proposed buildings that are going to go in right there 
(map) and that this would serve as their loading dock. They would, perhaps, have 
to share this easement with semi-trucks, piggy-backs or whatever else is going 
in there and this doesn't sound proper. 
Commissioner Bradley asked if this was correct. 
Mr. Reese Jensen showed them the plat and the access (couldn't hear 
what was being said). 
Mr. Hale stated that the reason this project isn't moving forward is 
that it isn't being done right or well. It wasn't the right use for the property 
for all concerned. He thinks that Hermes is very protective of their property 
rights - if they are relying on access into the Croxfords through an easement, 
there may be future problems for those that have to use that easement. He, for 
one, was confronted by the managing owner of Hermes Associates and asked to leave 
their property while he was on a public access area, on a sidewalk, collecting 
petitions for a referendum. He has a feeling that should there be other problems 
of discord, of rights-of-use, that an easement could be withdrawn by Hermes, as 
well as they have previously confronted those on a public access parts of their 
property. 
Commissioner Overson stated that the easement comes from the county, 
not Hermes. 
Commissioner Horiuchi stated that if they grant it in perpetuity, he 
suspects that it would only be the county that could remove it - Hermes couldn't. 
i 
Mr. Colessidos stated that it would be a permanent easement that goes 
with the property and cannot be withdrawn. 
Mr. Hale stated that this road is used by thousands of vehicles every 
day, it is a vital use in their community - the traffic patterns have been well 
documented and it is a heavily used road. Neighbors use it every day and the 
access to this neighbors property is seriously harmed, the safety and location 
of the home would be seriously jeopardized. How could they find 1020 East North 
Union Avenue with a wall and three stores around it if there should be a fire or 
emergency needs - he seriously questions whether that house could be located in 
the needs that would be there. Water rights along this, road needs to be 
protected and they need to address that issue. The Union Ditch leaves Little 
Cottonwood Creek, comes through this property, along the back side of this road 
that is going to be proposed to be the access for the Croxford property and they 
need to make sure that water rights are maintained through that property. 
Mr. Olsen stated that they have a petition to vacate a road, that is 
what is before this Commission and now they are changing it in the middle of the 
stream and saying that they aren't going to vacate that road, etc. He is telling 
them that they are going to vacate that road and vote on vacating that road or 
else they are going to bring it up, republish and do it over again. If they 
vacate the road, they get half of it, that is the law. Give them their half of 
the road, that's fine, go ahead and vacate it, give Hermes the one-half and them 
the other half, but they can't do both. If they want to change it, republish. 
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C oim n 1 mi il CHI in Uradlsy aoked Mr, Lew In firm n nil I mi It is poo ted as 
a vacati on 
Commissioner Horiuchi ulaLed that obviously wiliun £onxng BicuacionB 
they modify zoning issues at will, conditional uses within the scope of their 
responsibility and authority. If they decided, for example, not to grant 
anything tonight, that might be contrary to the issue and they would have to re-
notice that they were saying no. 
Mr, Lewis stated that if they don't vacate it, they are under no 
obligation, but to close it, it io more or loos a loooor remody. Tho potitlon 
is to vacate and they can, vacate or not vacate, they can do something less. 
Comm i • s i o n «i (J v a r i o n a o ke d i f t h e y co u 1 d vacate pa rt a nd n o t t he re s t 
of it. 
Mr. Lewis stated that this is what they are being proposed to do -
to vacate all of it except for this portion, but to close that portion, which is 
less than vacating it. They can litigate that as to whether they have to start 
over to close it, rather than vacate it, but he thinks it io. a lesser included. 
Commissioner Overion stated that it sounds to him that all of the 
attorney's are making their preliminary arguments for a court case and he moves 
that they close the public hearing and move forward with this. 
M r Allan Mo 11, D epu t y Cou n ty At to rn • y, s t a t«d t h a t t h• y w 1.11 i iot e 
that all of the agenda says is street vacation and that 1 s generic enougl i to 
support what Mr. Lewis is suggesting. 
Mr. Reed Boggesa stated that there are two streets, Middle Lane and 
North Lane, with North Lane becoming North Union Avenue and Middle Lane is the 
one they are talking about that is south of the Croxford property. Approximately 
twenty years ago Joe Overt sold his house/px'operty to Hermes, the canal was moved 
over and Harmons built. Everyone in the Port area agreed to sell to Hermes, 
except for Croxford and if they don't want to sell, they don't need to sell, but 
everyone else did and he has talked to many who have moved and they are enjoying 
their new location. He bets that this will be worked out and they will have a 
beautiful project there. 
Commissions! Bradley c, Losed the hearing at H I I H time. 
Commissioner Horiuchi made a Hiution to vacate thtt stttets as 
requested in the petition which will include the streets within the platted 
description and as they are located on the ground, except for a twenty-five wide 
segment of street abutting the Croxford/Johnson property on North Union Avenue. 
They will permanently close, but not vacate that section of the street as a 
public street and convey access easements across it to the Croxfords and Hermes. 
This decision is subject to the Engineer's and Attorney's Offices working out 
legal descriptions in the form of the ordinance and that they direct staff, Mr. 
Marsh and members of the Development Services staff, to work out a restriction 
on the kinds of vehicles that can access that basic easement (the idea being that 
semis shouldn't be there and other similar type vehicles). They can do this 
since they will have basically, ownership remaining in the public domain, they 
will be able to control that and this type of control mechanism should be worked 
out within the staff with consideration being made to the Croxfords so they don't 
have those type of semis or giant vehicles intruding on their lives. 
Mr, Marsh stated that there wan one other thing they should consider. 
There are some utili ty easements that may need to 'bo accommodated, so those need 
to be worked out. 
Commissioner Horiuchi asked that they woi k t llteiM* out t he utility 
easements as well as a staff - this is him motion. 
Commissioner Bradley called for a vote on the motion - vacate the 
streets as requested in the petition which will include the streets within the 
platted description and as they are located on the ground, except for a twenty-
five wide segment of street abutting the Croxford/Johnson property on North Union 
Avenue. They will permanently close, but not vacate that section of the street 
as a public street and convey access easements across it to the Croxfords and 
Hermes. This decision io subject to the Engineer's and Attorney's Offices 
working out legal descriptions in the form of the ordinance and that they direct 
staff, Mr. Marsh and members of the Development Services staff, to work out a 
restriction on the kinds of vehicles that can access that basic easement {the 
idea being that semis shouldn't be there and other similar type vehicles), and 
that they work out the utility easements as well as a staff, authorizing 
evelopment Services and the County Attorney to effect same, whereupon roll was 
called and showed the vote to bo: Commissioner Dradley "Nay," Commissioner 
Horiuchi "Aye" and Commissioner Overson "Aye." 
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EXHIBIT J 
NELSON v. PROVO CITY UtlA 35 
ate as 872 PJd 35 (UuhApp. 1994) 
3. Municipal Corporations £»657(7) 
Boyd NELSON, Lorraine Nelson, Steven When municipality has but a determm-
Whitlock, and Sheila Whitlock, able fee and does not own underlying fee 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, simple to roadway, vacation of roadway re-
sults in fee reverting to abutting landowners. 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 930227-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1994. 
Following city's purported vacation of 
roadway, abutting landowners brought suit 
seeking to establish their reversionary inter-
ests to middle of road. City counterclaim^ 
for quiet title to roadway. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, 
J , entered final judgment awarding legal and 
equitable title of roadway to city, and abut-
ting landowners appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Davis, J., held that: (1) city did not 
acquire fee simple title to dedicated roadway 
by virtue of Federal Townsite Act, but held 
roadway only in trust, with corresponding 
fiduciary duties to collective occupants of 
city, and (2) city did not properly vacate 
roadway, even assuming that it could do so in 
its capacity as trustee. 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Dedication <s=>53 
City did not acquire fee simple title to 
dedicated ioad\va\ bv virtue of Federal 
Townsite Act, and could not acquire such 
title unless it I evened ioadwa\ foi public 
u-e D\ ootaimng a deed until such time a n 
held roadua} in trust onl>, with correspond-
ing fiduciary duties to occupants of town 
U C A1953, 57-7-8, 57-7-17, 43 U.S C.(1970 
Ed) § 718 
2. Municipal Corporations <s»657(7) 
Even assuming that city could properly 
vacate roadway which it held only in trust for 
occupants of city, any interest that city held 
after vacating roadway would still be held in 
trust, and not in absolute ownership. 
4. Municipal Corporations <M>57(7) 
When municipality owns underlying fee 
to roadway, proper vacation of roadway 
would not change municipality's nght to un-
derlying fee. 
5. Municipal Corporations G»657(5) 
Roadway was not properly vacated, 
where city failed to notify abutting landown-
ers, or to notify its citizens generally pursu-
ant to statute until after purported vacation. 
U.CJU953, 10-8-8.4. 
James G. Clark (argued), Provo, for appel-
lants. 
Gary Gregerson, Provo City Atty^ and 
David Dixon, Asst. City Atty. (argued), Pro-
vo, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Appellants (Landowners) appeal a final 
judgment concluding that appellee Provo 
City (City) holds legal and equitable title (fee 
simple) to the portion of 900 South between 
100 East and Unnersity Avenue (Roadway) 
abutting Landownei > property We ie\erse 
and remand 
Pursuant to the Fecleial Town-ate \c* ot 
1W* the fedeial government deeded tht 
Roadway along with the abutting lands in 
trust to the local municipal authonty, Provo 
Mayor Abraham 0 Smoot, as trustee (the 
Townsite Conveyance) The Roadway exist-
ed as a public thoroughfare prior to this 
conveyance The parties do not dispute that 
Landowners' predecessors in interest did not 
occupy the Roadway or the abutting proper-
ty at the time of the Townsite Conveyance. 
Nor do they dispute that the metes and 
bounds of each subsequent conveyance ran to 
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the Roadway but did not specifically exclude 
it. 
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the 
Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876 deed-
ed the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a 
portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to 
appellants Stephen Whitlock and Sheila 
Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone 
received another portion of the Stubbs par-
cel. Finally, in 1991, appellants Boyd Nelson 
and Lorraine Nelson received a deed for 
another portion of the Stubbs parcel. 
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the 
Pvoadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of 
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, 
First Ward Pasture Company deeded its par-
cel to City. 900 South continued to be used 
as a public roadway. 
In its regularly scheduled meeting of Au-
gust 22, 1989, the Provo Municipal Council 
passed ordinance number 0-89-055, which 
purported to vacate and set aside the Road-
way. After passing the ordinance, City pub-
lished notice one time in the Provo Daily 
Herald on August 31, 1989. City mailed no 
notice of the vacation to the abutting land-
owners either before or after the fact. City 
then rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the 
property it owned to the south of the original 
route and sold the vacated portion of the 
original route to a commercial developer. 
The vacation of the Roadway landlocked one 
lot and deprived two other lots of access to 
900 South. 
Landowners sued City claiming a rever-
sionary interest in the Roadway from their 
property lines to the middle of the Roadway. 
They sought compensation and, in the alter-
native, the setting aside of the vacation. 
City counterclaimed for quiet title to the 
Roadway. 
On July 6,1992, the trial court quieted title 
in City as against Landowners, concluding 
that City held fee simple title since the time 
of the Townsite Conveyance. Landowners 
moved for specific findings regarding City's 
compliance with the Townsite Act and with 
the State Township Act. The trial court 
denied the motion. Landowners appeal. 
CITY'S INTEREST IN ROADWAY 
Landowners claim the court erred in con-
cluding the Townsite Conveyance conveyed a 
fee simple interest to City because (1) the 
patent, when read in context of the Townsite 
Act, conveyed the Roadway to City in trust 
only, and (2) City failed to reserve the Road-
way for public use pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-7-8 or -17 (1990). 
United States Patent 
[1] In 18G7, the United States Congress 
passed the Townsite Act, also known as "An 
Act of Congress for the Relief of the Inhabit-
ants of the Cities and Towns upon Public 
Lands." Federal Townsite Act, ch. 177, 14 
Stat. 541 (1867), codified as 43 U.S.C. § 718, 
repealed by P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 703(a), 
90 Stat. 2789 (1973). This act enabled town 
corporate authorities, as trustees, to acquire 
federally-owned property for their towns. 
The property was acquired 
in trust for the several use and benefit and 
use of the occupants thereof, according to 
their respective interests; the execution of 
which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in 
such town, and the proceeds of the sales 
thereof, to be conducted under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by 
the legislative authority of the State or 
Territory in which the same may be situat-
ed. 
Id. 
The Townsite Act limited townsite lands to 
those "actually occupied by the town and the 
title to which is in the United States." Id. 
The Townsite Act provided that the local 
legislative authority could make regulations 
for the disposition of the townsite lands. Id. 
However, "any act of said trustees not made 
in conformity to the rules and regulations 
herein alluded to shall be void." Id. See 
Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175 
P.2d 703, 705 (1946). 
Conveyances pursuant to the Townsite Act 
transferred title to town authorities in trust 
for the collective occupants. Conversely, 
town authorities could not hold the land as 
purchasers.1 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
Townsite Act to mean that conveyances 
1. The following exchange between senators illus- trates the intent of the Townsite Act that town 
NELSON v. PROVO CITY 
Cite as 872 P.2d 35 (UuhApp. 1994) 
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thereunder served to transfer equitable own-
ership of a parcel of land to an occupant only 
if the parcel was occupied at the time of 
transfer. Hall 175 P.2d at 705. Hall does 
not address the issue before us: whether a 
municipality has fee simple to a dedicated 
roadway where the abutting land was unoc-
cupied at the time the town acquired it.2 
Still, the language of the Townsite Act is 
clear that conveyances thereunder served to 
transfer land in trust to the municipality as 
trustee and not as absolute owner. 
Disposing Legislation 
Landowners claim that City could not ac-
quire title to 900 South under the patent 
unless Smoot reserved the street for public 
use by obtaining a deed. We agree. 
The Townsite Act provided that the local 
legislative authority could make regulations 
for the disposition of the townsite lands and 
"any act of said trustees not made in con-
formity to the rules and regulations herein 
alluded to shall be void." 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
Utah's disposing legislation is found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-7-1 to -19 (1990). 
Section 57-7-17 of the current code, and 
all predecessor statutes, provides as follows: 
Lots or parcels of land necessary for 
streets . . . may be reserved by the city 
commissioners, the mayor, the president of 
the board of trustees or the district judge, 
as the case may be; and he [or she] may 
authorities could not purchase the land, but must 
hold it in trust for the collective occupants: 
Mr. Howard: Docs the Senator from Califor-
nia mean to be understood that this bill pro-
vides that the corporate authorities of the town 
may become the purchasers? Is that the 
scheme here0 
Mr. Conness: No, sir. 
Mr. Howard: I so understood him. 
Mr. Conness: They simply enter the land as 
agents in trust for the occupants, those in 
possession. 
Mr. Howard: Do they get a title? 
Mr. Conness: A title for the occupants from 
the United States. 
Mr. Howard: Then they become the owners in 
trust. 
Mr. Conness: In trust. That is it exactly. 
Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109 
(1867). 
2. City cites Loeber v. Butte General Electric, 16 
Mont. 1, 39 P. 912 (1895) for the proposition that 
the municipality holds fee simple title as absolute 
execute and deliver to the proper party a 
deed for any property set aside for such 
purposes. 
Section 57-7-8 provides: 
If a city commissioner or the mayor of 
any city or the president of the board of 
trustees of any town shall be a claimant of 
lands in such city or town, the recorder or 
the clerk thereof, as the case may be, shall, 
upon the certificate of the district court 
made as in the case of other claimants, 
execute a deed of conveyance to such 
claimant for the lands finally adjudged to 
him [or her] by the court. 
In short, the Townsite Act, along with the 
state's disposing legislation, provide that a 
townsite conveyance transferred land to a 
municipality in trust. In order for the mu-
nicipality to own the land for itself, it, like 
any other claimant, would have to obtain a 
deed. 
Here, the parties agree that City never 
explicitly reserved the Roadway or obtained 
a deed to the Roadway pursuant to section 
57-7-3 or -17. Thus, City remains holder of 
the Roadway in trust City purported to 
vacate the Roadway as absolute owner, with-
out regard to its responsibilities as trustee or 
the provisions of Title 57. Accordingly, we 
remand this matter to the trial court to 
consider City's role as trustee of the Road-
way, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries, in this case, the collective occu-
pants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718. 
owner to a street derived from a townsite convey-
ance. In Loeber, the disputed alley had been 
included in the original townsite survey and the 
abutting land had been occupied at the time of 
the townsite transfer. The issue of whether the 
municipality held the alley in fee simple or as a 
determinable fee was not beiore the court. The 
court held that because the alley in question had 
been dedicated to public use before the convey-
ance of the lot, the abutting landowner "was not 
the owner in fee of the alley" and thus the 
abutting landowner could not complain of the 
installation of electric poles in the alley. Id. 39 
P. at 913. This holding is not helpful to resolu-
tion of this case because it does not resolve 
whether the municipality held a determinable fee 
or an absolute fee in the alley. The municipality 
in Loeber needed only to have held a determin-
able fee or even an easement to permit installa-
tion of the electric poles. 
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DETERMINABLE FEE 
[2] Landowners claim the trial court 
erred in failing to conclude that upon vaca-
tion of the Roadway, the fee to the center 
line of the Roadway would revert to them as 
abutting property owners. 
[3,4] Utah case law relies on common 
law to support the theory that where a mu-
nicipality has but a determinable fee3 and 
does not own the underlying fee simple, the 
vacating of the roadway results in the fee 
reverting to the abutting landowners. Sears, 
572 P.2d at 1363; White v. Salt Lake City, 
121 Utah 134. 239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952); Fa-
lula Famia, 866 P.2d at 571. See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-8.5 (Supp.1993) (vacating 
of public roadway dedicated to public use by 
proprietor terminates city's determinable fee 
therein). Conversely, where a municipality 
owns the underlying fee to a roadway, proper 
vacation of such would not change the munic-
ipality's right to the underlying fee. Sears, 
572 ?2d at 1363. 
While City may hold the Roadway in fee 
simple, that interest is held in trust. Thus, 
even if City as trustee had (or could have) 
properly vacated the Roadway, City's inter-
est would still be held in trust and not in 
absolute ownership. This brings us to 
whether or not City properly vacated the 
Roadway. 
NOTICE TO VACATE 
[5] Landowners claim City did not prop-
erly vacate the Roadway because it did not 
provide proper statutory notice to abutting 
landowners and City's other occupants. 
A municipality may not vacate a street 
unless it has provided proper notice pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 10^8-3.4 (1992). No-
tice is given "by publishing in a newspaper 
published or of general circulation in such 
city once a week for four consecutive weeks 
preceding action on such petition or intention 
3. A fee simple determinable expires automatical-
ly on the occurrence of a stated event. See 
Black's Law Dictionary 615-16 (6th ed. 1990). 
Thus, where a municipality has a determinable 
fee in a roadway, common law provides that the 
limited fee ends when the roadway is vacated. 
See Falula Farms v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569, 571 
(Utah App.1993). Unlike the situation here a 
. . . and by mailing such notice to all owners 
of record of land abutting the street or alley 
proposed to be vacated " Id. See oho 
Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 
1974) (purported vacation of roadway nullity 
where no notice given to abutting landowners 
or general public); Boskovich v. Midvcde 
City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437 
(1952) (improper vacation of street and alley 
denied abutting landowners due process); 
Tooele City v. Elkingion, 100 Utah 485, 116 
P.2d 406, 407. 410 (Utah 1941) (mayor could 
not quitclaim alley by resolution to abutting 
land owner in contravention of vacation stat-
ute even where land had been deeded to city 
by federal government). 
Here, City did not notify abutting land-
owners, nor did it notify its citizens generally 
pursuant to statute. In fact, the single pub-
lished notice ran after the purported vaca-
tion. Thus, City's notice was not only insuffi-
cient, it was untimely. As a result, any 
purported vacation of the Roadway is a nulli-
ty. See Boskovich, 243 P.2d at 437. We 
therefore reverse the court's conclusion that 
City properly vacated the Roadway and re-
mand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act con-
veyed the Roadway to City in trust only; (2) 
hold that City never explicitly reserved the 
Roadway or obtained a deed to the Roadway 
pursuant to statute; (3) remand for consider-
ation of City's role as trustee of the Road-
way, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries; and (4) reverse the court's de-
termination that City properly vacated the 
Roadway. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
municipality typically obtains a determinable fee 
in roadways when the same are accepted thereby 
pursuant to the final approval of a subdivision 
plat. That was the case in Sears v. Ogden, 572 
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977). Here, we deter-
mine that whether City's interest was that of a 
determinable fee or a fee simple, the interest was 
held only in trust. 
EXHIBIT K 
Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners 
Jim Bradley CHAIRMAN 
Randy Horiuchi 
Brent Overson 
! 1 .'..:;•! 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEVELOPMENT GEHViCE 
Pb4fylCD I J u l y 13 , 1994 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N2100 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-1000 
Tel (801) 468-3350 
Fax (801) 468-3535 
Ms. Katie L. Dixon 
County Recorder 
Government Center, North Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Ms. Dixon: 
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved the 
attached Ordinance #1270 - Vacation & Closure for North Union Avenue/1035 East 
and 1115 East. 
Said ordinance reflects action taken by the Commissioners on May 25, 1994. The 
25' easement to the south of the Croxford property between 2240 South and the 
closed portion of North Union Avenue will be a public right-of-way. It is the 
county's responsibility to maintain the public right-of-way unless a maintenance 
agreement is worked out with Hermes. Title to the land within the vacated roads 
will revert as a matter of law to the abutting property owner (Hermes) upon 
enactment of this ordinance. Compensation for the interest of the county in the 
streets is being worked out between Hermes and the real estate office. 
The ordinance has been published in a newspaper of general circulation. 
Pursuant to the above, you are hereby directed to place same on record for no fee 
and return the recorded document to the Commission Clerk. 
Very truly yours, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK 
1
 Deput 
hfp 
cc: 
end. 
Attorney/Kent Lewis 
Real Estate/Roger Hillam 
Public Works/Lonnie Johnson 
envelopment Serv/Bill Marsh 
Newspaper 
2f y 
ORDINANCE NO. /<£ 70 DATE 
AN ORDINANCE VACATING PORTIONS OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 1035 EAST AND 
1115 EAST, AND PERMANENTLY CLOSING A PORTION OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 
ALL WITHIN THE UNION FORT PLAT. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as 
follows: 
SECTION I. Vacation and Closure Ordinance No. /<£ J$ is 
enacted as follows: 
1. The following segments of North Union Avenue, 1035 East 
and 1115 East, within the Union Fort Plat, a subdivision recorded 
on January 13, 1857 in the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, are 
hereby vacated: 
Beginning at the southeast corner of Lot 1, 
Block 9, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision 
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, and running thence 
North 17° East 12 rods; thence North 73° West 
10 rods, more or less, to a point South 17° 
West 2 rods from the southwest corner of Lot 
9, Block 12, Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° 
East 2 rods to said southwest corner of Lot 9, 
Block 12; thence South 73° East 32.5 rods to 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 12; 
thence South 17° West 2 rods, more or less, to 
the old fort wall; thence South 73° East 15.41 
rods, more or less, to a point North 25° East 
15 feet, more or less, from the northeast 
corner of Lot 23, Block 10, said Union Fort 
Plat; thence South 25° West 15 feet, more or 
less, to said northeast corner of Lot 23; 
thence North 73° West 33 rods to the northwest 
corner of Lot 13, said Block 10; thence South 
17° West 12 rods to the southwest corner of 
Lot 12, said Block 10; thence South 73° East 
40.91 rods, more or less, to the southwest 
corner of Lot 3, Block 11, said Union Fort 
Plat; thence South 17° West 13 rods to the 
southwest corner of Lot 6, Block 6, said Union 
Fort Plat; thence South 73° East 25.5 rods to 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 6; 
thence South 31°48' West 19.45 feet along the 
west line of 1300 East Street; thence North 
73° West 30.11 rods, more or less, to a point 
South 17° West 0.14 rods, more or less, from 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 7, said 
Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° East 12.14 
rods, more or less, to the northeast corner of 
Lot 24, said Block 7; thence North 73° West 6 
rods to the northeast corner of Lot 22, said 
Block 7; thence North 17° East 25 feet; thence 
North 73° West 12 rods; thence South 17° West 
25 feet to the northwest corner of Lot 19, 
said Block 7; thence North 73° West 18 rods to 
the northwest corner of Lot 13, said Block 7; 
thence South 17° West 12 rods to the southwest 
corner of Lot 12, said Block 7; thence North 
73° West 15 feet, more or less, to the old 
fort wall and the East line of 1035 East 
Street; thence North 17° East 15 rods, along 
said wall and said East line of 1035 East 
Street; thence North 73° West 4 rods to the 
point of beginning. Contains 2.01 acres, more 
or less, as described. 
2. The following segment of North Union Avenue within the 
Union Fort Plat is hereby permanently closed: 
Beginning at the southwest corner of Lot 6, 
Block 7, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision 
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder and running thence 
North 17° East 12 rods to the northwest corner 
of Lot 19, said Block 7; thence North 17° East 
25 feet; thence North 73° West 25 feet; thence 
South 17° West 223 feet to the South line of 
said Block 7; thence South 73° East 25 feet to 
the point of beginning. Contains: 0.128 
acres. 
3. That the segment of North Union Avenue described in 
paragraph 2 is being closed rather than vacated in order that Salt 
Lake County may convey an access easement over said property to 
Hermes Associates Ltd., the adjacent property owner on the north, 
and to the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Fort 
Union Plat, the adjacent property owners on the south ("south 
2 
property owners"), which will allow better access to their 
respective properties than by having the property revert as a 
matter of law, half to each by vacation; that the south property 
owners will still have direct access to 7240 South and will be 
provided additional access to the north side of the properties from 
7240 South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-way which will be 
conveyed by Hermes Associates Ltd. to Salt Lake County. The 25 
foot public right-of-way will revert to Hermes Associates, Inc. in 
the event it acquires the south properties. 
4. The segments of the described streets being vacated 
include any additional area within the streets as they exist on the 
ground except as to the segment of North Union Avenue described in 
paragraph 2, which is being closed rather than vacated. 
5. This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of 
County Commissioners that due and proper notice of the hearing to 
vacate the particular portions of said public highways was duly 
given according to law; that the segments of said public highways 
being vacated and the segment being closed are not needed as a 
public highway or a public right-of-way; that the vacation and 
closure will not be detrimental to the interest of Salt Lake County 
or to the general public; that neither the public nor any person 
will be materially injured thereby and that the vacation and 
closure of said highways accordingly is appropriate and should be 
done. 
3 
6. All right, title and interest in and to the said portion 
of said public highways being vacated is to revert by operation of 
law to the abutting property owners or owners. 
7. The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to 
record this ordinance and make the necessary changes on the 
official plats and records of the County to reflect the same, 
8. This ordinance shall have no force or effect upon any 
easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing 
public franchises, water drainage easements, pipeline easements or 
other uses as presently exist under, over or upon the vacated 
portion of said public highways or as may be shown on the official 
plats and records of the County. 
SECTION II. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days 
after the date of its enactment upon one publication in a newspaper 
in and having general circulation in Salt Lake Coupty. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED this /§ day of 
*4tt 
Date 
1994. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTEST: 
>alt Lake County Cler 
att.rt-unionvac.ks1 
Commissioner Bradley voting "Hay" 
Commissioner Horiuchi voting"Ave" 
Commissioner Overson voting "AVP" 
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EXHIBIT L 
Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners 
Jim Bradley CHAIRMAN 
Randy Horiuchi 
Brent Overson 
RECEIVED 
AUG 1 2 1994 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICE 
August 10 , 1994 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N2100 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-1000 
Tel (801) 468-3350 
Fax (801) 468-3535 
Ms. Katie L. Dixon 
County Recorder 
Government Center, North Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Ms. Dixon: 
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved the 
attached CORRECTED ORDINANCE #1275 - vacating portions of North Union Avenue, 
1035 East and 1115 East and Closing a Portion of North Union Avenue. 
The corrected ordinance vacates portions of North Union Avenue, 1035 East & 1115 
East and permanently closing a portion of North Union Avenue. The original 
ordinance #1270 was approved July 13, 1994, and incorrectly described the portion 
of North Union Avenue being closed. 
The ordinance has been published in a newspaper of general circulation. 
Pursuant to the above, you are hereby authorized to place same on record for no 
fee and return the recorded document to the Commission Clerk. 
Very truly yours, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
SHERRIE SWENSEN, COUNTY CLERK 
Deputy C. 
hfp 
cc: 
end. 
Attorney/Kent Lewis 
Attorney/Reiko 
Public Works/Lonnie Johnson 
^Envelopment Serv/Bill Marsh 
U.S. Post Office 
Address Program Support Office 
1760 West 2100 South #130 
SLC, UT 84199 
Newspaper 
CORRECTED ORDINANCE NO. 1275 DATE August 10, 1994 
Superseding Ordinance No. 1270 
Recorded in Book 6981, Page 0671 
AN ORDINANCE VACATING PORTIONS OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 1035 EAST AND 
1115 EAST, AND PERMANENTLY CLOSING A PORTION OF NORTH UNION AVENUE, 
ALL WITHIN THE UNION FORT PLAT. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as 
follows: 
SECTION I. Vacation and Closure Ordinance No. 1275 is 
enacted as follows: 
1. The following segments of North Union Avenue, 1035 East 
and 1115 East, within the Union Fort Plat, a subdivision recorded 
on January 13, 1857 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, are 
hereby vacated: 
Beginning at the southeast corner of Lot 1, 
Block 9, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision 
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, and running thence 
North 17° East 12 rods; thence North 73° West 
10 rods, more or less, to a point South 17° 
West 2 rods from the southwest corner of Lot 
9, Block 12, Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° 
East 2 rods to said southwest corner of Lot 9, 
Block 12; thence South 73° East 32.5 rods to 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 12; 
thence South 17° West 2 rods, more or less, to 
the old fort wall; thence South 73° East 15.41 
rods, more or less, to a point North 25° East 
15 feet, more or less, from the northeast 
corner of Lot 23, Block 10, said Union Fort 
Plat; thence South 25° West 15 feet, more or 
less, to said northeast corner of Lot 23; 
thence North 73° West 33 rods to the northwest 
corner of Lot 13, said Block 10; thence South 
17° West 12 rods to the southwest corner of 
Lot 12, said Block 10; thence South 73° East 
40.91 rods, more or less, to the southwest 
corner of Lot 3, Block 11, said Union Fort 
Plat; thence South 17° West 13 rods to the 
southwest corner of Lot 6, Block 6, said Union 
Fort Plat; thence South 73° East 25.5 rods to 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, said Block 6; 
thence South 31°48/ West 19.45 feet along the 
west line of 13 00 East Street; thence North 
73° West 30.11 rods, more or less, to a point 
South 17° West 0.14 rods, more or less, from 
the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 7, said 
Union Fort Plat; thence North 17° East 12.14 
rods, more or less, to the northeast corner of 
Lot 24, said Block 7; thence North 73° West 6 
rods to the northeast corner of Lot 22, said 
Block 7; thence North 17° East 25 feet; thence 
North 73° West 12 rods; thence South 17° West 
25 feet to the northwest corner of Lot 19, 
said Block 7; thence North 73° West 18 rods to 
the northwest corner of Lot 13, said Block 7; 
thence South 17° West 12 rods to the southwest 
corner of Lot 12, said Block 7; thence North 
73° West 15 feet, more or less, to the old 
fort wall and the East line of 1035 East 
Street; thence North 17° East 15 rods, along 
said wall and said East line of 1035 East 
Street; thence North 73° West 4 rods to the 
point of beginning. Contains 2.01 acres, more 
or less, as described. 
2. The following segment of North Union Avenue within the 
Union Fort Plat is hereby permanently closed: 
Beginning at the northwest corner of Lot 19, 
Block 7, Union Fort Plat, a subdivision 
recorded 13 January 1857 in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder and running thence 
South 73° East 12 rods to the northeast corner 
of Lot 22, said Block 7; thence North 17° East 
25 feet; thence North 73° West 12 rods; thence 
South 17° West 25 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
3. That the segment of North Union Avenue described in 
paragraph 2 is being closed rather than vacated in order that Salt 
Lake County may convey an access easement over said property to 
Hermes Associates Ltd., the adjacent property owner on the north, 
and to the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and 22, Fort 
Union Plat, the adjacent property owners on the south ("south 
2 
property owners"), which will allow better access to their 
respective properties than by having the property revert as a 
matter of law, half to each by vacation; that the south property 
owners will still have direct access to 7240 South and will be 
provided additional access to the north side of the properties from 
7240 South through a 25 foot wide public right-of-way which will be 
conveyed by Hermes Associates Ltd. to Salt Lake County, The 25 
foot public right-of-way will revert to Hermes Associates, Inc. in 
the event it acquires the south properties. 
4. The segments of the described streets being vacated 
include any additional area within the streets as they exist on the 
ground except as to the segment of North Union Avenue described in 
paragraph 2, which is being closed rather than vacated. 
5. This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of 
County Commissioners that due and proper notice of the hearing to 
vacate the particular portions of said public highways was duly 
given according to law; that the segments of said public highways 
being vacated and the segment being closed are not needed as a 
public highway or a public right-of-way; that the vacation and 
closure will not be detrimental to the interest of Salt Lake County 
or to the general public; that neither the public nor any person 
will be materially injured thereby and that the vacation and 
closure of said highways accordingly is appropriate and should be 
done. 
6. All right, title and interest in and to the said portion 
of said public highways being vacated is to revert by operation of 
3 
law to the abutting property owners or owners. 
7. The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to 
record this ordinance and make the necessary changes on the 
official plats and records of the County to reflect the same. 
8* This ordinance shall have no force or effect upon any 
easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing 
public franchises, water drainage easements, pipeline easements or 
other uses as presently exist under, over or upon the vacated 
portion of said public highways or as may be shown on the official 
plats and records of the County. 
SECTION II. This ordinance supersedes Ordinance 1270 which 
incorrectly described the portion of North Union Avenue being 
permanently closed. 
SECTION III. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days 
after the date of its enactment upon one publication in a newspaper 
in and having general circulation in Salt Lake County. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED this 10th day of August , 1994. 
ATTEST: 
Salt Lake County Clerk 
ttt.rt.wpdocj.uaiooimd.ksi 
~
Pp
*CiVPr> 
*QR|t 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Chairman 
Commissioner Bradley voting ,fNay" 
Commissioner Horiuchi voting"Ave" 
Commissioner Overson voting "Ave" 
